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Essay I: Which countries receive aid as insurance and why? A
theory of optimal aid policy
Empirical evidence shows that developing countries with opaque institutions
receive procyclical Official Development Aid (ODA) while developing countries with
transparent institutions receive acyclical or countercyclical ODA. This paper pro-
vides a dynamic equilibrium model of optimal aid policy that quantitatively accounts
for this fact. In the model, the donor wants to (a) encourage actions by the aid re-
ceiving government that increase output and (b) smooth out economic fluctuations.
The transparency of institutions in the country affects the donor’s ability to dis-
tinguish downturns caused by exogenous shocks, from those caused by government
actions. The solution to the donor’s mechanism design problem is dependent on
the transparency of government actions. If the donor has good information about
government actions, aid policy is countercyclical and aid acts as insurance. How-
ever, if the donor is unable to infer perfectly the cause of the downturn, aid policy
is procyclical to encourage unobservable good actions. The model predicts a similar
pattern for ODA commitments for the following year which is supported by the
data. For countries with opaque institutions procyclical aid is the result of optimal
policies given the information constraints of donors.
Essay II: New Evidence on the Relationship Between Aid Cycli-
cality and Institutions
This paper documents a new fact: the correlation between official development
assistance (ODA) and GDP is negatively related to the quality of institutions in the
receipient country. Differences in institutional indicators that measure corruption,
rule of law, government effectiveness and government transparency are particularly
important. The results are robust to several modifications. The results hold for both
pooled and within regressions specifications and for different sources of institutional
quality measures. This fact also reconciles conflicting empirical results about the
correlation between ODA and GDP in the literature. For instance, Pallage and
Robe (2001) find a positive correlation in two thirds of African economies and half
of non-African developing economies, but Rand and Tarp (2002) find no correla-
tion in a different set of developing countries. First, once institutions are accounted
for, African economies are not treated differently by donors. Second, the sample in
Rand and Tarp (2002) comprises developing economies which have relatively good
institutions, therefore, those countries receive acyclical or countercyclical aid.
Essay II: Optimal Procyclical Fiscal Policy Without Procyclical
Government Spending
Procyclical fiscal policy can be caused by either procyclical government expen-
diture, countercyclical taxes or both. The majority of models which try to explain
procyclical fiscal policy as the result of optimal policy have procyclical government
expenditures. This paper develops a model which optimally generates procyclical
fiscal policy while keeping government expenditures acyclical. Instead, taxes are
optimally countercyclical. The model uses endogenous sovereign default to gen-
erate an environment where interest rates are lower in booms than in recessions.
If household’s have insufficient access to financial instruments it is optimal for the
government to lower taxes and borrow during booms. This enables impatient house-
holds to benefit from the lower interest rates in booms by helping the consumer bring
consumption forward.
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Chapter 1
Which countries receive aid as insurance and why? A theory of
optimal aid policy
1.1 Introduction
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is one of the most important instru-
ments with which developing countries finance their current account deficits. This
observation has prompted a number of papers to suggest that welfare in develop-
ing countries could be improved if aid flows were countercyclical or less volatile, in
order to smooth the consumption of households in developing countries (Bulir and
Hamann, 2003; Pallage, Robe and Berube, 2006, Arellano, Bulir, Lane and Lips-
chitz, 2009). This reasoning stands in sharp contrast to the empirical findings of
Pallage and Robe (2001) who show that ODA is predominantly procyclical. This
raises a critical question: Why are aid flows not given countercyclically?
In Banerjee (2010), I provide an empirical insight into this question. I show
that developing countries with weak institutions (in particular, institutional mea-
sures related to government transparency) receive strongly procyclical ODA while
developing countries with good institutions receive acyclical or countercyclical ODA.
For ODA disbursements (actual aid given) the inverse relationship between institu-
tional quality and the procyclicality of aid is strongest for bilateral ODA and weaker
1
for multilateral ODA. However, for ODA commitments (aid promises for the next
year) the inverse relationship between institutional quality and aid procyclicality is
strongest for multilateral donors but insignificant for bilateral donors.
Section 1.3 examines the impact of institutions on donor behaviour in a case
study to understand why some countries receive aid as insurance while others do
not. It contrasts the nature of aid flows to Malawi and Zaire. Although both Malawi
and Zaire went through structural adjustment in the early 1980s, Malawi, which had
relatively good institutions, received strongly countercyclical aid, whilst Zaire with
weak institutions received strongly procyclical aid. The case study finds that for
Malawi, donors worked closely with the government and trusted that the govern-
ment had implemented reforms effectively. Donors therefore attributed downturns
to exogenous events. This prompted donors to give aid as insurance to Malawi.
However, in Zaire donors inferred that government actions were at least partially
responsible for the downturns, while the government claimed the downturns were
caused by donor policy. The case study concludes that the transparency of actual
government policies and the credibility of announced policies being implemented
influences donor decisions to provide aid as insurance or not. The paper also shows
that the measures of institutions that are most negatively related to the correlation
between aid and GDP are those which contain information about the transparency
of government actions, such as the level of corruption, transparency of public insti-
tutions and rule of law.
The main part of the paper provides a calibrated dynamic moral hazard model
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that accounts for these facts. The model considers an altruistic donor that cares
about the utility of the poor in a developing country. The donor wants to (a)
increase the level of consumption and (b) smooth out economic fluctuations of the
poor. There is a recipient government that can divert some of the aid to a favoured
subgroup. The recipient government can undertake costly actions that increase
expected output, which benefits society at large. However, the donor’s ability to
monitor government actions depends on government transparency.
In countries with transparent institutions, recipient government actions are ob-
servable, which allows donors to distinguish downturns caused by exogenous shocks
from those cause by recipient government actions. Therefore, with full information,
the donor’s optimal policy is to condition aid on observable actions and give aid
countercyclically as insurance against economic fluctuations.
In contrast, in countries with less transparent institutions, it is harder for the
donor to monitor recipient government actions. Because the donor is unable to
distinguish perfectly downturns caused by exogenous shocks from those caused by
government actions. Thus the recipient government faces a moral hazard problem.
With moral hazard, the donor solves the mechanism design problem by conditioning
disbursed aid (and aid commitments for the next period) on observable output and
other observable signals, to encourage actions that increase expected output. The
mechanism rewards high output states with more aid and low output states with
less. If the donor were to give aid as insurance in downturns, there would be no
incentive for the government to incur the cost of higher effort because actions that
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increase GDP are not rewarded by more aid, while actions that decrease GDP are
rewarded with more aid. Therefore, with moral hazard, the donor is unable to
encourage government effort to increase GDP while simultaneously smoothing out
economic fluctuations. Thus the optimal aid policy for the donor is procyclical if
the donor cannot perfectly observe the source of the shocks and the benefits from
higher government effort outweigh the costs of not smoothing consumption.
The dynamic dimension of the model provides an explanation for the different
behaviour of aid flows from multilateral and bilateral donors. In the model, this
difference in the behaviour can be explained if we assume that multilateral donors
are forward looking and use not only aid disbursements but also aid commitments
to encourage good actions while bilateral donors are myopic and rely entirely on
aid disbursement alone. There is some evidence to support this assumption. In the
data there is evidence that bilateral ODA commitments are used to stabilise coun-
tries which have had coups rather than encouraging good policy (Banerjee, 2010).
Therefore, it appears that bilateral ODA disbursements alone are used to encour-
age good actions. This can also explain the stronger relation between institutional
transparency and the procyclicality of bilateral aid disbursements in the data.
Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder (2002) empirically examine
the impact of institutions on the level of aid a country receives. Both studies do not
find a significant relationship between institutions and the level of aid. Any model
which attempts to match the cyclical properties of aid in Banerjee (2010) must also
simultaneously match this fact about the level of aid. The model in this paper uses
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a realistic mechanism to allow the level of aid to be independent of institutional
quality, while at the same time maintaining the inverse relationship between in-
stitutional quality and the correlation between aid and GDP. The model assumes
there is a separate branch of the donor government/organisation which exogenously
promises a level of utility to the recipient government perhaps for political reasons.
This promise determines the expected level of aid in equilibrium. Actual aid dis-
bursements are administered by a separate aid agency which is altruistic in the
sense of the donor described above. This paper shows that it is still optimal for the
altruistic aid agency to give countercyclical aid to countries with good institutions
and procyclical aid to countries with weak institutions, over all empirically relevant
levels of aid.
The results from this paper directly address the policy debate about whether
aid flows are welfare inefficient and destabilising in developing countries (Bulir and
Hamann, 2003; Pallage, Robe and Berube, 2006; Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2008;
Arellano, Bulir, Lane and Lipschitz, 2009). This paper shows that conditional on
having good institutions, aid does act as insurance for developing countries during
downturns. In the model, as the quality of institutions deteriorates, aid becomes
more procyclical under the optimal policy. Therefore, the fact that some developing
countries receive procyclical aid could be a conscious decision on the part of donors.
The paper shows that if aid were given countercyclically to countries with weak
institutions, welfare would be reduced. With moral hazard, countercyclical aid
removes the incentive for recipient governments to incur effort. This reduces the level
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of GDP in the developing country, reducing welfare. Some of this GDP reduction is
mitigated by the countercyclical aid which smooths consumption, but this positive
welfare effect is dominated by the negative welfare cost from lower GDP. To achieve
the same welfare of the donor’s target group with countercyclical aid, the aid to
GDP ratio would need to be increased from 10% to 20% of GDP.
The model is closest to Svensson (2000) and follows the literature on optimal
aid contracts with an altruistic donor and a recipient government that favours the
welfare of a subset of agents in the economy (Adam and O’Connell, 1999, Svens-
son, 2000, Azam and Laffont, 2003). This paper extends the analysis by solving a
calibrated intertemporal moral hazard problem using the techniques of Spear and
Srivastava (1988) and Phelan and Townsend (1991). It then goes onto show how this
model can quantitatively explain the dynamics of aid flows to developing countries.
Section 1.2 examines the empirical relationship between aid, GDP and insti-
tutions. Section 1.3 examines a two country case study to illustrate how donors
treat different types of governments. Section 1.4 presents the theoretical model and
describes the solution method, section 1.5 discusses the calibration and section 1.6
compares the model to the data. Finally section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Stylised facts on the cyclical relationship between aid and GDP
Banerjee (2010) presents five stylised facts that any model of the cyclical be-
haviour of ODA must explain:
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1. The comteporaneous correlation between institutional quality and the corre-
lation between aid disbursements and GDP is negative. Countries with weak
institutions receive strongly procyclical aid while countries with good institu-
tions receive countercyclical aid.
2. The correlation between institutional quality and the correlation between mul-
tilateral aid commitments in period t + 1 and GDP in period t is negative.
For multilateral ODA, countries with weak institutions receive procyclical aid
commitments while countries with good institutions receive countercyclical aid
commitments.
3. The volatility of GDP is independent of institutional quality.
4. The volatility of aid is independent of institutional quality.
5. The level of aid per capita is uncorrelated with institutional quality.
The model should be able to generate both procyclical and countercyclical aid
for the same level of aid per capita. Furthermore the model must provide a plausible
explanation for the different properties of multilateral and bilateral aid flows.
In Banerjee (2010), I generates these stylised facts using a dataset composed
of annual data from 1974 to 2007. A country is excluded if it is not in Africa,
Asia, South America, the Carribean or Central America. A recipient country is also
excluded from the sample if it had not achieved independence by the end of 1975.
Furthermore, countries are dropped if aid or national accounts data are unavailable
prior to 1988. Countries are also dropped due to country coverage of institutional
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quality measures. The final sample for the main regression results reported here
consists of 61 developing countries.
The data on aid flows come from the Official Development Assistance (ODA)
figures published by the OECD’s DAC database. The OECD collects information
on aid disbursements (actual aid given in a year) and aid commitments (promises
of aid for the year)1. ODA disbursements are measured as the net value of grants
and concessional loans2. ODA commitments are measured on a gross basis because
net figures are not published.
GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). All series are deflated by the purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP deflators
from the Penn World Tables prior to 2000 and thereafter using the WDI PPP
deflators. Capital flow data are also taken from the WDI. Capital flows are measured
as the sum of net foreign direct investment (FDI), equity investment portfolio flows
and portfolio investment bond flows to both the private and government sectors.
To compute the cyclical properties of ODA and GDP per capita, I detrend
the data using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and drop the endpoints. For my main
results I use a weighting parameter of 10, as suggested by Baxter and King (1995)
for annual data. The results are also robust to using the Baxter-King (1999) band
pass filter as an alternative filtering mechanism.
1Celasun and Walliser (2008) provide a detailed statistical analysis of the relationship between
ODA commitments and disbursements. They find that commitments are predictors of disburse-
ments, but a large unexplained component remains.
2Loans must have a concessional nature to qualify as ODA. For example IMF, standby agree-
ment credits are not considered ODA because they are given at interest rates sufficiently close to
market rates.
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The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings are used as the main
source for institutional quality data. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
ratings provide the longest time series with broad country coverage starting in 1982
with further improvements in the coverage of developing countries in 1985. The
ICRG provides quantitative assessments of countries provided by a group of uniden-
tified private experts not necessarily resident in the country. For the main results, I
use the mean of scores from (a) corruption, (b) rule of law/law and order tradition
and (c) private expropriation risk as my main measure of institutional quality.3 A
higher score implies higher quality institutions.4
1.2.1 ODA disbursements
Figure 1.1 plots institutional quality against the correlation between detrended
total ODA disbursements and detrended GDP.5 The inverse relationship between
the quality of institutions and the correlation between ODA disbursements and GDP
is clear. The correlation between ODA disbursements and GDP ranges from 0.9 to
-0.55. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 plot the same graph for multilateral and bilateral ODA
disbursements respectively.6 The inverse relationship between institutions and the
aid-GDP correlation is still evident.
3I re-scale the private exproptiation risk scores onto a [0,6] scale to conform with the scale of
the corruption and rule of law scores.
4These measures of institutions come from Knack and Keefer (1995) who used the underlying
ICRG data to construct the IRIS 3 dataset which measures: corruption, ethnic tension, rule of law,
quality of bureaucracy, repudiation of government contracts and expropriation risk. Since Knack
and Keefer (1995) these measures of institutions have been used in many studies e.g. Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) to analyse the impact of institutions on economic development and
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005) to explain why capital does not flow from rich to
poor countries.
5See Banerjee (2010) for details further details about the data used.
6Bilateral aid constitutes around two thirds of ODA and multilateral around one third.
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Table 1.1: Determinants of the correlation between ODA disbursements and GDP
Corr (aid, GDP) Total Multilateral Bilateral
Institutions -0.107*** -0.080** -0.103***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.029)
Obs 122 122 122
Adj. R2 0.083 0.046 0.078
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 1.1 summarises Banerjee’s (2010) results from regressing the correlation
between ODA and GDP on institutional quality. The coefficient on institutions is
significant at the 1% level for total and bilateral ODA disbursements and significant
at the 5% level for multilateral disbursements. Banerjee (2010) also shows that these
results are robust to including both country and time fixed effects.7
Countries that had relatively poor institutions in the 1970s, but improved
them by the 1990s (e.g. Ghana and Uganda) had a high correlation between aid
and GDP in the 1970s and early 1980s, but a relatively low correlation in the 1990s
and beyond. On the other side, countries which had relatively good institutions in
the 1970s and early 1980s but declining institutional quality thereafter (e.g. Cote
d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone) show the opposite trend. Countries which had poor in-
stitutions throughout had a high correlation between aid and GDP in all decades
(e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo), while countries with relatively good institu-
tions throughout had a low correlation between aid and GDP in all decades (e.g.
Malawi).
7This implies that the changes in aid procyclicality are also negatively correlated with changes
in institutional quality.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of the correlation between ODA disbursements and GDP,
with controls
Corr(aid, GDP) Total Multilateral Bilateral
Institutions -0.077 * -0.030 -0.103***
(0.041) (0.038) (0.038)
Aid/GDP 0.386 0.131 0.721
(0.510) (1.374) (0.855)
Average(GDP) -0.036 -0.029 -0.036
(0.062) (0.065) (0.067)
SD(Aid) 0.078 0.028 0.150
(0.098) (0.100) (0.096)
SD(GDP) 1.231 1.191 0.930
(1.022) (1.075) (1.222)
Conflict dummy -0.090 -0.044 -0.154*
(0.093) (0.091) (0.087)
Coup dummy -0.057 -0.036 -0.033
(0.072) (0.066) (0.073)
Polity IV -0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Civil War dummy -0.013 -0.004 -0.011
(0.025) (0.020) (0.025)
Inflation Crisis 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
SD(Terms of Trade) 0.217 0.239 0.068
(0.349) (0.383) (0.381)
Capital Flows/Aid 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs 122 122 122
Adj R2 0.126 0.109 0.119
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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For total and bilateral ODA, the negative relationship between institutions and
the aid-GDP correlation is robust to controlling for a multitude of other possible
explanatory variables (Table 1.2), although, this is not true for multilateral aid.
Table 1.2 shows that neither the volatility of GDP, the volatility of aid nor the aid
to GDP ratio are significant in explaining the correlation between aid and GDP for
Total and Bilateral ODA. These results are in line with Pallage and Robe (2001)
and Bulir and Hamann (2003), who do not find significant relationships between
these variables and the correlation of aid with the business cycle. Any model which
attempts to explain differences across countries in the correlation between aid and
GDP must be capable of doing so independent of these variables. The negative
relationship between institutions and the correlation between aid and GDP is also
robust to controlling for other plausible explanatory variables such as the prevalance
of coups in a country, armed conflicts, the political structure, civil liberties and
inflation crises and the capital flows to aid ratio (table 1.2).
These results indicate that countries with weaker institutions receive more
procyclical aid on average. As institutions improve, aid becomes acyclical or coun-
tercyclical on average. For those countries with good institutions, aid often does act
as insurance during downturns. The results of a robust significant relationship be-
tween institutions and aid cyclicality is striking because the previous literature failed
to find any relationship between the level of aid and the quality of policy (World
Bank, 1998, Dollar and Svensson, 2000, Alesina and Dollar, 2000 and Alesina and
Weder, 2002).
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Rule of law Quality of bureaucracy
Expropriation risk Repudiation of government contracts
Kaufmann Kraay
Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality
Voice and accountability




Public sector management and institutions Equity of public resource use
Structural policies cluster Financial sector rating
Debt Policy Fiscal policy rating
Property rights and rule base governance Budgetary and financial management
Efficiency of revenue mobilisation Quality of public administration
Economic management cluster Trade rating
All regressions run will controls
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Table 1.4: Determinants of the level of aid
Aid per capita (1) (2)
Institutions -0.259* -0.140
(0.155) (0.148)
GDP per capita -0.252*
(0.162)
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
In Banerjee (2010), I also use the 1996 Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) gover-
nance indicators and the 2006 World Bank CPIA institutional quality measures as
alternatives to the measure constructed from the ICRG. Table 1.3 lists the institu-
tional quality measures which are significantly related to the correlation between aid
and GDP. For the Kaufmann and Kraay indicators, control of corruption, rule of
law and government effectiveness are significant. The CPIA measures for the qual-
ity of structural policy, public sector management and institutions and efficiency of
revenue mobilistion appear most strongly correlated with the correlation between
aid and GDP. Overall, these alternative measures of institutions suggest that trans-
parency and trust in the quality of decision-making of the government, property
rights and the ability of the government to carry out announced plans influence
whether a country receives procyclical or countercyclical aid. Note that measures
of institutions unrelated to transparency and credibility such as ethnic tension and
equality, are not related to the correlation between aid and GDP.
Turning to the relationship between the level of ODA and institutions, Table
2.15 confirms the results of Alesina and Weder (2002) that the level of ODA a
country receives is not influenced by institutional quality. The results show that
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Table 1.5: Determinants of the correlation between ODA commitments and GDP
Corr(aid com., GDP) Total Multilateral Bilateral
Institutions -0.014 -0.060** 0.026
(0.023) (0.026) (0.028)
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
once GDP per capita is controlled for, the institutional quality variable is not a
significant explanatory variable for the level of aid. Thus institutions matter for the
cyclical characteristics of aid but not the level of aid a country receives. This is an
important fact that any theory of aid cyclicality must replicate.
1.2.2 ODA Commitments
Motivated by the model in this paper, Banerjee (2010) also examines the
cyclical relationship between GDP and ODA commitments for the following year.
Table 1.5 shows the results from regressing the correlation between aid commitments
and GDP on institutional quality. The correlation between institutional quality and
the correlation between ODA commitments for period t+ 1 and GDP in period t is
negative and significant at the 1% level for multilateral ODA commitments. Figure
2.9 also shows that the correlation between multilateral ODA commitments and
GDP is negatively correlated to my measure of institutional quality. These results
are also robust to including both country and time fixed effects.
In Banerjee (2010), I also show that the results in Table 1.5 are robust to
including additional control variables. Interestingly coups are a significant explana-
tory variable for the cyclicality of total and bilateral ODA commitments (Table 1.6).
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Table 1.6: Determinants of the correlation between ODA commitments and GDP,
with controls
ODA Commitments Total Multilateral Bilateral
Institutions 0.000 -0.099** 0.046
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Coups -0.140*** -0.084 -0.135**
(0.052) (0.061) (0.055)
plus control variables
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 1.7: Determinants of the volatility of aid and GDP
Dependent variable SD(aid) SD(aid) SD(GDP) SD(GDP)
Institutions 0.389* 0.251 -0.0165*** -0.010
(0.218) (0.170) (0.006) (0.006)
Average(GDP) 0.282 -0.013*
(0.269) (0.007)
Note: White standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The sign is negative, which suggests that countries that experience a coup have less
procyclical ODA commitments than countries that do not. It would appear that bi-
lateral donors use ODA commitments for other purposes (e.g. stabilising a country)
rather than using aid commitments to encourage better government policies.
1.2.3 Institutions and volatility of aid and GDP
Table 1.7 examines the relationship between institutional quality and the
volatility of aid and the volatility of GDP. While there is a positive relationship
between the volatility of aid and institutional quality, it is not significant once the
level of GDP in the country is accounted for. There is also a negative relationship
between the volatility of GDP and institutional quality but once the level of GDP
16
Table 1.8: Business cycle moments
Total Multilateral Bilateral
Good Weak Good Weak Good Weak
SD(GDP) 0.043 0.064 0.043 0.064 0.043 0.064
SD(ODA dis.) 0.235 0.261 0.358 0.305 0.306 0.248
SD(ODA com.) 0.282 0.299 0.432 0.429 0.315 0.304
corr(GDP, ODA dis.) -0.209 0.418 -0.082 0.245 -0.158 0.378
corr(GDP, ODA com.) -0.158 0.020 -0.235 0.122 0.007 -0.069
(ODA dis.)/GDP % 1.3 6.1 0.5 2.0 2.4 4.6
min(ODA dis./GDP) % 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06
max(ODA dis./GDP) % 18.1 44.8 7.26 17.2 12.9 25.5
Note:(1) Sample split into good and weak institutions by the median value in the sample.
Note:(2) ODA dis. are ODA disbursements, ODA com. are ODA commitments.
Note: (3) Correlations are taken from the trend line in tables 1.1 and 1.5
is accounted for, this relationship is also not significant. Therefore, there does not
appear to be a strong relationship between institutional quality in a country and
the volatility of aid or the volatility of GDP in that country.
1.2.4 Business cycle statistics
Table 3.1 shows cross country averages of key business cycle moments from my
dataset which I will use to calibrate the model. The countries are divided into those
with good and weak institutions, defined as those with above and below median
institutional quality. As expected from the results above, the correlation between
aid and GDP is lower in the group with better institutions. The median volatility
of aid is approximately similar across groups, which which is not surprising given
the results from table 1.2. GDP is slightly more volatile in countries with weaker
institutions. The median aid to GDP ratio is higher for countries with weaker
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institutions. However, the maximum and minimum aid to GDP ratios for countries
with good and weak institutional quality show there is very little correlation between
institutional quality and the amount of aid a country receives. Furthermore table
2.15 that the correlation between quality and the level of aid is not significant once
one controls for the level of GDP.
1.3 A case study: Aid flows to Malawi and The Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Given the empirical relationship between institutional quality and the correla-
tion between aid and GDP, I compare the contrasting aid experiences of Malawi and
Zaire8 to better understand which aspects of institutional quality influence donor
behaviour. Malawi traditionally had better institutions than Zaire. During the early
1980s, when both countries faced difficult economic adjustments, they both coop-
erated with donor conditions and met donor targets. However, during the 1980s
Malawi received strongly countercyclical aid flows (Figure 2.1) while Zaire received
strongly procyclical aid flows (Figure 2.2). Why were the aid experiences so differ-
ent?
By 1979 both countries had adopted stabilisation plans and standby agree-
ments with the IMF due to balance of payments difficulties. By 1982 Malawi had
made more progress meeting the objectives of the plan than Zaire (Gulharti, 1989
8I refer to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by its former name since I am focussing on
that period of its history.
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and Kiakwama and Chevallier, 2001) but Zaire “adopted a comprehensive and far
reaching reform program in 1983 ... [t]he adjustment during 1983-85 was substantial
... [d]ebt service payments were made on schedule and external arrears were sub-
stantially reduced, but [this] failed to generate additional donor support” (p.632 para
5 Kiakwama and Chevalier, 2001). This account of events is reflected in Figure 2.2,
where GDP per capita is decreasing after 1980, while aid flows remain below 1980
levels. Despite following donor plans closely, Zaire did not receive aid as insurance
against the downturn.
Malawi suffered a financial crisis in 1985 (Harrigan, 1991). The government re-
sorted to domestic borrowing and the pace of inflation accelerated (Gulharti, 1991).
The drop in GDP can be seen in Figure 2.1, but in contrast to the experience of
Zaire, aid to Malawi clearly increased during the downturn.
In Zaire, with opaque institutions, donors had very little information about
government actions. To encourage beneficial government actions, donors increased
aid only after observable variables improved because they could not monitor the
actions themselves.
Wrong (2001) indicates that the donors clearly had very little information
about actual government actions: “ ‘We never had solid data, because they [the
Zairian authorities] weren’t willing to provide it,’ admitted a senior World Bank
economist. ‘We could never get a good grasp of what was happening.’” (p.209 para.
1, Wrong, 2001).
Young and Turner (1985) argue that donors had not only very little infor-
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mation about government actions, but also that official flows were dependent on
information about government actions: “... the IMF had rescinded Zaire’s eligibil-
ity for higher tranche credit, noting that the country was not meeting arrears, and
that indeed it had no notion of what Zaire was doing.” (p.383 para. 4, Young and
Turner, 1985).
Given this lack of information about government actions, Young and Turner
(1985) show that the donor community instead conditioned aid on observable out-
comes: “In mid-1981 this temporary improvement [in macro variables] led to another
- and larger - IMF advance of approximately $950 million. Soon thereafter Zaire
was again out of compliance with the agreement, and by 1982 further advances had
again been cut off.” (p. 384, para. 3, Young and Turner, 1985).
Furthermore, Wrong (2001) argues that donors understood the incentive effect
of withholding aid in downturns on government actions: “... the first structural
adjustment programme went into action, at the end of 1982. [...] there was also
a feeling in Washington that with national bankruptcy now a concrete threat and
this regime unchallenged on the political front, Mobutu might see the need to knuckle
down. For three years the calculation seemed the right one as, under the tutelage of
Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo, Zaire set in place a reform program regarded as
a model of its kind.” (p.210 para. 1, Wrong, 2001).
In contrast, in Malawi, there were few areas of asymmetric information be-
tween the donors and the government about the implemented policy because “
[s]taff of these international organizations undertook the bulk of the analysis (or
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helped the government to define, supervise and finance expatriate consultants who
did the policy analysis) that underpinned the reforms.” (p.39 para. 3, Gulharti,
1991). Gulharti (1991) concludes that Malawi’s poor economic performance in the
1980s was a case of ‘promising reforms, bad luck’. It appears that because of the
close working relationship with the government, the donors could monitor reform
implementation more clearly in Malawi than in Zaire. This is arguably why donors
were willing to give more aid to Malawi during downturns, because donors could
more clearly evaluate that the downturn due to exogenous shocks and not due to the
government not fulfilling promised actions. Meanwhile, in Zaire, donors had very
little information about the government’s actual actions, they could not observe the




I consider a developing economy inhabited by two groups, called rich and poor.
The economy is closed except for foreign aid flows, to capture the fact that the ma-
jority of developing countries in my sample have very limited access (if any) to
international capital markets. There is a government of the developing country and
a foreign donor. To capture the fact that aid is given for both political and economic
purposes, I assume that independent of the donor administering the aid disburse-
ments (e.g. USAID), there is another branch of the donor organisation/government
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(e.g. The State Department) which exogenously promises a level of utility w0 to the
developing country at t = 0. This separates the level of aid from the cyclical be-
haviour.9 The promise w0 will determine the expected level of aid a country receives
in equilibrium. The donor administering the aid disbursement would like to ensure
the recipient government exerts effort to improve the welfare of the poor, subject
to the political constraint of delivering welfare w0 to the recipient government. The
donor administering the aid cares about the welfare of the poor and pays a constant





βt[u(cpt )− φat] (1.1)
where β is the discount rate of the donor, u(.) is the period utility function of
the poor in the country, with u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0, cpt is the consumption of the
poor, at is the amount of aid disbursed in period t and φ is the marginal cost of aid.
The government of the country cares about the welfare of both the rich and
the poor. Actions (policy) by the government can increase the expected output of
the economy. However, these actions are costly to the government. The recipient




γt [θv(crt ) + (1− θ)u(cpt )− g(et)] (1.2)
9Alesina and Dollar (2000) showed that the level of aid is determined independent of institutions,
while political alliances were found to be an important determinant of the level of aid.
10This can be thought of as a constant marginal cost for the use of funds for other pur-
poses/countries.
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where γ is the discount factor of the government, θ measures the degree of
favouritism of the government towards the rich, v(.) is the period utility function of
the rich and is concave with v′(.) > 0 and v′′(.) < 0 and crt is the consumption of
the rich in period t. The function g(.) is convex with g′(.) > 0 and g′′(.) > 0 and
measures the cost of effort et by the government.
Effort by the government increases output yt in the developing country. Out-
put is determined by a set of conditional probability distribution functions of y
conditional on e and is denoted by f1(y|e). It is assumed that it is impossible to
perfectly infer the government’s effort perfectly from output outcomes:
f1(y|e) > 0 ∀e (1.3)
Also for any ehigh > elow, f1(y|ehigh) first order stochastic dominates f)1(y|elow).
The donor also receives a signal st of the government’s effort. The distribution
of st conditional on yt and et is denoted by
f2(st|et, yt) (1.4)
Applying the definition of a conditional probability, the probability of observ-
ing yt and st conditional on effort et is given by
f(yt, st|et) = f1(yt|et)f2(st|yt, et) (1.5)
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The government runs a balanced budget and chooses the distribution of output
between the rich and poor. The donor can give aid directly to the poor in order to
increase the welfare of the poor, but the aid is subject to diminishing returns. Thus
the economy faces the following resource constraints,
crt = yt − dt (1.6)
and
cpt = dt + h(at) (1.7)
where dt is the amount of output given to the poor by the government. Fol-
lowing the empirical results from Clemens, Radelet and Bhavani (2004) about the
short-run impact of aid, there are decreasing returns to aid, h′(.) > 0, h′′(.) ≤ 0 and
h(0) = 0.
1.4.2 Recipient government’s problem in Autarky
In autarky, the government receives no aid. The solution to this problem
provides a lower bound on the donor’s aid problem. The donor must at least give
the autarky level of utility to government. If the donor does not, it is optimal for the
government to choose autarky and not follow the donor’s plan. The government’s
problem in autarky is to choose both effort and the optimal division of output
between the rich and poor conditional on the level of aid a. For tractability, I assume
no storage. Under this condition the government’s dynamic problem reduces to a
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[θv(yt − dt) + (1− θ)u(dt)− g(et)] dF1(yt|et) (1.8)
The first order condition of the government for the optimal choice of d equates
the ratio of the marginal utilities of the rich and poor to the ratio of their weights
in the utility function. While the parameter θ indexes the inequality in the country




v′(yt − dt) (1.9)
Assuming that effort e is discrete (as done in the numerical section), the opti-
mal choice of e in autarky is obtained by computing the level of e which generates
the highest value for V given the first order condition (1.12) and a. For example
suppose for two levels of effort eh and el there are two conditional distributions func-




θv(y − d(y, a)) + (1− θ)u(d(y, a) + h(a))− g(ei)] dF1(y|ei) for i = h, l
(1.10)
If V h > V l then the benefit from the high level of effort outweigh the costs and
the higher level of effort eh is chosen. Else if V h < V l the costs of the higher level
of effort outweigh the benefits and the low level of effort is chosen. This method
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avoids the need to check the conditions in Rogerson (1985) when using the first
order approach.
Let V aut denote the solution to the autarky problem. This is the solution to
(1.11) when aid equals zero.
1.4.3 Recipient government’s problem with Aid
With positive aid flows, the government’s problem is reduced to only choosing
the optimal division of output between the rich and poor conditional on the level of
aid a. The government’s effort e is effectively ‘chosen’ by the donor when the donor




[θv(yt − dt) + (1− θ)u(dt + h(at))− g(et)] dF1(yt|et) (1.11)
The first order condition of the government for the optimal choice of d is





v′(yt − dt) (1.12)
The optimal choice of d is a function of y and a, denoted as d(y, a). The share
of output going to the poor is decreasing in aid, ∂[d(y, a)]/∂a < 0. Therefore, with
higher aid, the government has less incentive to transfer resources to the poor and
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less incentive to do higher effort to increase total output y11.
1.4.4 Donor
The donor’s ability to monitor the recipient government’s effort is dependent
on the transparency of institutions. In countries where government institutions are
transparent, the donor receives perfect signals about government effort. However, as
the transparency of government institutions deteriorates, the donor receives increas-
ingly noisy signals about actual government actions until the signals are so noisy
that they contain no information about government effort. The quality of informa-
tion affects the donor’s optimal aid contract. In the following sections I will first
examine the two extreme cases, when the donor has a perfect signal about govern-
ment effort and when the donor has a completely uniformative signal of government
effort and then examine the case when the donor has a partially informative signal
of government effort. Holmstrom (1979) shows that when the signal is partially
informative the optimal policy is to use information from all available signals in the
optimal policy. When solving for the optimal aid contract the donor also takes into
account the recipient government’s d(y, a) function and the return to aid function
h(a).
11For example, if θ = 0.5 and u(.) = v(.) then the optimal division of output for the government
dt(y, a) = 0.5[yt − h(a)].
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1.4.4.1 Donor’s problem with full information
With very good institutions the donor receives informative signals about the
recipient government’s effort. I concentrate on the full information case in which st
is so precise that it allows the donor perfectly observes recipient government effort.
Aid can be made conditional on both output y and effort e. I assume that aid
cannot be conditioned on the allocation of output given to the poor by the recipient
government, d.12 With no storage, the solution to the donor’s dynamic problem
with full information is equivalent to solving a sequence of static problems with full




[u(d(y, a) + h(a))− φa]dF (y, s|e) (1.13)
s.t.
∫
[θv(y − d(y, a)) + (1− θ)u(d(y, a) + h(a))− g(e)] dF (y, s|e) ≥ w0 ≥ V aut
(1.14)
where equation (1.14) is the individual rationality constraint of the govern-
ment, which ensures that the government receives at least the utility it would have
received in autarky.
The preferences of the donor are specified such that the donor wants to (a)
increase output in the developing country (through encouraging recipient govern-
12The problem described here where the ability to observe effort depends on institutional quality
is isomorphic to a problem where the ability to observe and contract upon d depends on institutional
quality.
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ment effort) and (b) smooth out economic fluctuations. The optimal aid policy with
full information is an aid contract conditional on effort, output and w0. The ability
to condition aid on observable effort will enable the donor to attain these dual ob-
jectives simultaneously. I describe the properties of the optimal aid policy later in
section 3.5.
1.4.5 Donor’s problem with hidden government effort
In countries with weak institutions the donor has noisy signals about the level
of effort the government exerts. Because the donor cannot observe effort e the
optimal contract can no longer be conditioned on e. The donor observes output
y and the additional signal s and can condition the optimal contract on y and s
outcomes. The donor uses the revelation principle to ensure the government selects
the level of effort prescribed by the donor in the optimal contract.
I follow Spear and Srivastava (1987) and introduce the concept of promised
utility w as a state variable to make the problem recursive. Let w0 be the exogenous
initial utility promised at t = 0. The donor’s problem with incomplete information
is similar to the full information problem, with additional incentive compatibility
constraints to ensure that the government selects the level of effort prescribed by
the donor.
At the beginning of each period the donor takes as given the utility w promised
to the recipient government in period t − 1. Given w the donor selects functions
for effort e(w), aid a(w, y) and next period promised utility w̃(w, y) to maximise
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(1.1) subject to delivering the promised level of utility and ensuring the government





[u(d(y, a) + h(a))− φa+ βJ(w̃)]dF (y, s|e(w)) (1.15)
s.t. the promise keeping constraint
w =
∫
{[θv(y − d(y, a)) + (1− θ)u(d(y, a) + h(a(w, y)))− g(e(w))]
+γw̃(w, y)}dF (y, s|e(w))
(1.16)
and incentive compatibility constraints
∫
[θv(y − d) + (1− θ)u(d+ h(a(w, y)))− g(e(w)) + w̃(w, y)]]dF (y, s|e(w))
≥
∫
[θv(y − d) + (1− θ)u(d+ h(a(w, y)))− g(ê) + w̃(w, y)]]dF (y, s|ê) ∀ê (1.17)
Constraint (1.16) says that the value of the aid contract to the government
must be equal to the promised utility w coming into the period. The incentive com-
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patibility constraints (1.17) state that the value to the government of selecting the
level of effort prescribed by the donor must be greater than the returns from any
deviation in each state. The incentive compatibility constraint is the key differen-
tiating feature in the model with unobservable government effort compared to the
model with observable government effort.
Remember that the preferences of the donor are specified such that the donor
wants to both increase output in the developing country and smooth out economic
fluctuations. Ideally the donor would like to give aid as insurance against downturns,
but because the donor is unable to observe effort directly, it cannot distinguish
whether the downturn is exogenous or due to low government effort. Because output
is a noisy signal of government effort, the donor can condition aid on observable
output. The donor can also condition aid on the signal s. If effort increases output,
a contract which gives more aid when output is high rewards high effort on average.
On the other hand, if the donor were to give more aid in downturns, there would be
no incentive for the government to incur the cost of higher effort because actions that
increase GDP are not rewarded with more aid. If the benefits from government effort
are small relative to the welfare benefit of smoothing consumption, it is possible




In moral hazard problems, the revelation principle requires a large number of
incentive compatibility constraints to be satisfied. This can potentially make the
constraint set non-convex. I follow Phelan and Townsend (1991) and use randomi-
sation which overcomes this problem by convexifing the constraint set of the donor.
Phelan and Townsend (1991) show that this enables dynamic programming theo-
rems to be applied to moral hazard problems. Note that deterministic rules are just
a subset of probabilistic rules with degenerate distributions. Furthermore, applying
randomisation to the donor’s problem presented in this paper is also a very realistic
description of historical donor behaviour. Consider the following quote from Mosley
et. al. (1991b, p.2):
“We encountered a number of cases where weak recipients gambled, sometimes
correctly and sometimes not, that they could nonetheless get away with high levels
of slippage.”
The randomisation works as follows. The government selects effort e from a
finite set E ⊂ R+. For a given effort e ∈ E, output y is determined by a prob-
ability density function, P1(y|e) which is analogous to the continuous probability
distribution function f1(y|e) in section 1.4. The probability P1(y|e) is assumed to
be strictly positive for all e so that any level of output is possible given any effort
level. I denote this set of possible outputs as Y . The additional signal s ∈ S is
determined by the probability density function, P2(s|y, e) is analogous the f2(s|y, e)
in section 1.4. The joint density function of y and s conditional on e is given by
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P (y, s|e) = P1(y|e)P2(s|y, e) Foreign aid gives the government some level of aid
a ∈ A where A is a finite subset of R+. w is the utility promised to the government
and can take any value from the set W = [V aut, wmax], where V
aut is the utility of
the government in autarky and wmax is the highest level of utility attainable (i.e.
the lowest effort and maximum aid).
The donor’s problem with randomisation is to choose a probability distribution
Π(e, y, a, w′, s) to maximise the Bellman equation
J(w) = max
Π
{u(d(y, a) + h(a))− a+ βJ(w′)}Π(e, y, a, w′, s) (1.18)




{θv(y−d(y, a))+(1−θ)u(d(y, a)+h(a))−g(e)+γw′}Π(e, y, a, w′, s)
(1.19)
and for the hidden action problem, the incentive compatibility constraints for
each e, ê pair:
∑
Y×A×W×S





{θv(y−d(y, a))+(1−θ)u(d(y, a)+h(a))−g(ê)+γw′}Π(a, w′, y, e, s)P (y, s|ê)
P (y, s|e)
(1.20)
Note that (1.19) is the discrete counterpart to (1.16) and the discrete coun-
terpart to the set of incentive compatibility constraints is equation (1.20). Also
the donor internalises the government’s division of resources function d(y, a) when
solving its problem.
The final conditions with probabilistic decision rules are that the implied con-
ditional probabilities must coincide with those imposed by nature, P (y, s|e). For
each (ē, ȳ) pair the following condition must hold
∑
A×W
Π(ē, ȳ, s̄, a, w′) = P (ȳ, s̄|ē)
∑
Y×A×W×S
Π(ē, y, a, w′, s) (1.21)
Finally the probabilities from the probabilistic optimal policy must follow the
laws of probability
Π(e, y, a, w′, s) ≥ 0 (1.22)
and ∑
E×Y×A×W×S
Π(e, y, a, w′, s) = 1 (1.23)
The model is solved using value function iteration with the Howard improve-
ment algorithm until convergence of value functions. The steps of the algorithm are
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the following:
1. Guess an initial function v0(w)
2. For each w solve a linear programming13 problem using equations (1.18) through
(1.23) to obtain policy functions, which consist of probabilities Π1(e, y, c, w′)
that maximise the Bellman equation (1.18).
3. Compute vi+1(w) as the discounted present value of following policy Π1.
4. Use vi+1(w) as the guess in step 2 until convergence (vi = vi+1).
1.5 Calibration
I calibrate parameters so that the dynamic model with unobserved effort
matches three moments estimated from countries with the least transparent in-
stitutions: the volatility of GDP, the volatility of disbursed aid and the correlation
between ODA and GDP. Informative signals are then introduced to test whether the
model can reproduce the differences between countries with transparent and opaque
institutions in tables 1.1 and 1.5, holding all structural parameters fixed aside from
the transparency of information.
1.5.1 Functional Forms
I now describe the procedure used to select benchmark parameter values. The
period utility function of the poor is u(c) = cσ/σ and u(c) = v(c). The period utility
13The linear programming problem is written in Python and solved using the GNU Linear
Programming Kit (GLPK), both of which are free open source software (FOSS).
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function of the government is θv(cr)+(1−θ)u(cp)−g(e) = θcσr /σ+θcσp/σ+χ(emax−
e)δ. Aid has decreasing returns to scale, where a units of aid produce h(a) = aα
units of consumption goods.
The technology specifying the conditional probability density functions P1(y|e)
is given by
P1(y = y
high|e) = 0.1 + eψ (1.24)
P1(y = y
low|e) = 1− P1(y = yhigh|e) (1.25)
where e is suitably bounded [0,1] such that the probability density functions
are well defined. Output takes two discrete values and the ratio of yh/yl equals 20%
to match the standard deviation of annual GDP of 6.5%.
In the results section I examine the model with the two extremes of full infor-
mation about government effort and hidden government effort. I also examine the
model properties with a partially informative signal about government actions. The
density function P2(s|y, e) is given by
P2(s = s
high|y, e) = 0.25y + 0.05e (1.26)
P2(s = s
low|y, e) = 1− P2(s = shigh|y, e) (1.27)
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The signal is informative in that the probability of receiveing a signal that
the governemt does higher effort is increasing in government effort e. However, the
signal is only partially informative. Furthermore, probability of receiving a signal
that the government is doing higher effort is contaminated with the output state
where high output outturns are positively correlated with high output signals.
In my baseline model, I set the discount factors β and γ equal to 0.7 for both
the donor and government in order to match the standard deviation of annual aid,
28.8%. The discount factors are on the low end of the usual estimates. Mechanically,
if β were set to 0.9 in the model, the volatility of disbursed aid would become
very small. This is because the donor mostly uses aid promises (commitments) to
encourage government effort instead of aid disbursements (see section 1.6.5). The
low discount factor can be justified by assuming a constant probability x of regime
change or break in the relationship between government and donor with a mean
(1/x) of around 5 years, along with a utility discount rate of β = 0.9 which implies
an effective discount factor of (1 − x)β = 0.7. Given estimates for the average
duration of regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America with a mean of 8 years and
median of 4.5 years, (Stier and Mundt, 1998) this is not an unrealistic calibration.
I calibrate σ, the parameter governing the curvature of utility, to 0.8 in order to
match the correlation between ODA disbursements and GDP taken from the trend
line in table 1.1 with a transparency score of 1.0 constructed from the ICRG data.
I set the returns to scale in aid parameter α to 0.5. This number is derived from
fitting the Cobb-Douglas returns to aid function to the estimates of the short-run
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Table 1.9: Parameter Values
Target
Ratio of Output yhigh/ylow 20% SD(GDP) = 0.064
Curvature parameter σ 0.8 Corr(Aid, GDP) = 0.436
Discount factor β = γ 0.7 SD(Aid) = 0.288
Returns to aid α 0.5 Short-run returns to aid (Clemens et. al., 2004)
Weight on effort χ 0.2 eaut = 0
Weight on rich θ 0.5
Marginal cost of aid φ 1
Table 1.10: Matched moments
Moment Data Model (hidden actions)
SD(GDP) 0.064 0.067
SD(Aid) 0.261 0.255
Corr(Aid, GDP) 0.418 0.377
impact of aid provided in Clemens, Radelet and Bhavani (2004).
The weight on effort in the utility function is mechanically set to 0.2 in order
to make the autarky level of effort in the model equal zero. Finally, I parameterise
the weight on the rich in the government’s utility function θ to 0.5.
Table 1.10 shows that the baseline model with hidden effort does a good job at
matching the data moments for countries with the weakest institutions. To test the
model, I keep all other parameters constant and add information about government
effort to the donor’s information set to capture the increase in transparency of
government actions as institutions improve. I then evaluate the ability of the model
to match the observed moments for countries with the most transparent institutions.
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1.6 Results
The results section is structured as follows. I first examine the policy functions
of the calibrated model assuming (1) full information and (2) completely hidden
actions (i.e. with a completely uninformative signal). I then examine the ability of
the model to match the moments of both countries with transparent and opaque
institutions only using differences in the informativeness of signals.
I show that the model can explain four of the five stylised facts presented in
section 1.2. The model can explain the negative relationship between institutional
quality and the correlation between disbursed ODA and GDP as well as the negative
relationship between institutional quality and the correlation between ODA com-
mitments and GDP. The model can match these facts for all empirically relevant
levels of aid. Furthermore, the volatility of GDP is uncorrelated with institutional
quality. However, in the model the volatility of aid is not independent of institu-
tional quality. Instead, the model predicts a counterfactual decrease in the volatility
of aid as institutions improve. The model also over predicts the correlation between
GDP and ODA commitments.14
14Unfortunately, I do not have data for net ODA commitments. My model does not have a
measure of gross ODA commitments, therefore, it is difficult to attribute the inability to fit the
moments to model or data issues. Comparing data from net ODA disbursements to gross ODA
disbursements, there is a deterioration in the model fit with gross ODA disbursements which
suggests that the use of gross ODA commitments is partially attributable to some of the poor fit.
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1.6.1 Full information - transparent institutions
Figure 1.7 plots the equilibrium aid policy function conditional on an initial
promised government utility w0, output y and effort e. The solid line is expected
aid in high output states and the dashed line expected aid in low output states. The
key point to note is that the solid line is always below the dashed line15. This shows
that with full information, aid is given as insurance against bad states because more
aid is disbursed in low output states than in high output states for any given initial
promise w. Figure 1.7 also shows that aid is countercyclical for aid to GDP ratios
between 0% to 200%.
Figure 1.8 plots the equilibrium effort level conditional on promised utility w.
It shows that the optimal level of effort is a negative function of the initial promise.
Therefore, as the exogenous promised utility w0 increases, the effort the donor can
optimally extract from the recipient government decreases. Under full information,
the level of effort is a weakly monotonically decreasing function of the promised level
of utility.
Figure 1.9 plots the equilibrium utility of the donor J(w), conditional on the
government’s promised utility w. If w0 were set optimally by the donor distributing
the aid, it would be the maximum point on the curve. On the left hand side of the
maximum, the utility function is upwards sloping because the marginal utility of
the poor is greater than the cost of aid, while the promise is still sufficiently low to
ensure that the government exerts the maximum effort. Therefore, in this region
15While the difference in aid disbursements between high and low output states is visually small,
the simulation results below, show that this sufficiently large to match the data moments.
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increasing aid is a Pareto improvement.
1.6.2 Hidden effort - opaque institutions
In stark contrast to the full information model, figure 1.10 shows that a positive
relationship between aid and output is obtained when the donor cannot observe
effort directly. The solid and dashed lines plot optimal aid conditional on high and
low output respectively. In contrast to the full information equilibrium, the solid
line is almost always above the dashed line, except for very high exogenous promises
w0. Aid becomes countercyclical only for values of w0 corresponding to aid to GDP
ratios greater than 200%, far in excess of maximum aid to GDP ratios observed in
the data. The average aid to GDP ratios is around 6%. Therefore, in equilibrium
the donor disburses less aid in low output states than in high output states for all
empirically relevant regions (Table 3.1).
For all but the highest utility promises w, because the donor is unable to
condition aid on effort directly, the donor must reward periods of high output in
order to encourage the government to select the effort prescribed by the donor.
However, for the highest initial promises w0 the only way the donor can attain those
promises is by allowing the government to exert the lowest level of effort and then
giving aid as insurance.
Figure 1.11 plots government effort as a function of promised utility w. When
the donor promises the lowest level of utility (the autarky level) then the government
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Table 1.11: Benchmark Model Moments: Total ODA
Data Model Data Model
Weak institutions Hidden action Good institutions Full information
σ(y) 0.043 0.067 0.064 0.063
σ(a) 0.261 0.252 0.235 0.159
σ(a′) 0.299 0.169 0.282 0
ρ(a, y) 0.418 0.377 -0.209 -0.468
ρ(a′, y) 0.096 0.518 -0.158 0
ρ(e, y) 0.150 0.021
exerts the lowest effort level16. Therefore, unlike the full information problem, the
level of effort is not monotonically decreasing with promised utility w.
Figure 1.12 plots the equilibrium policy functions for next period’s promised
utility w′. Note that these functions straddle the 45 degree line, with high output
states above and low output states below. Thus promised utility is also procyclical
for countries with weak institutions. Combining the aid policy functions in figure
1.10 with those for promised utility in figure 1.12, promised utility w′ can be mapped
into expected aid (aid commitments) for the next period. Figure 1.13 shows that
aid commitments are also procyclical in countries with weak institutions, as found
in the multilateral aid data.
1.6.3 Business Cycle Moments
I simulate the model by averaging moments from 1000 simulations of 15 periods
each, because the empirical moments are also computed over 15 year windows. The
simulation moments are computed using the same method as the data moments.
16I calibrate the model such that the autarky effort level is the lowest level of effort.
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For the results below, the initial value of w0 for each simulation is the value which
maximises the donor’s utility. Changing initial promise has very little impact on
the results. This property enables the model to match the fact that the cyclical
properties of aid flows are independent of the level of aid a country receives because
the initial promise determines the level of aid a country receives.
Table 1.11 presents the simulated moments of the benchmark model with hid-
den effort and compares them to the model with full information. The introduction
of information causes the correlation between aid disbursements and GDP in the
model to switch from procyclical (0.377) to countercyclical (-0.468). As institutions
improve and the donor has better information about the actual effort of the re-
cipient government, the correlation between aid and GDP decreases. In the data
meanwhile, the correlation between aid and GDP is 0.418 for the countries opaque
institutions and -0.209 for the countries with transparent institutions. The model
with hidden effort predicts a positive relationship between aid commitments and
GDP, as in the data. However, the predicted correlation between aid commitments
and GDP is far too high, being 0.518 in the model and only 0.095 in the data. Also
the model is unable to generate a negative correlation between aid commitments
and GDP under full information. This is due to the tractability assumption of i.i.d.
shocks. If shocks were persistent, then the correlation between aid commitments
and GDP would also be negative for countries with transparent institutions.
The volatility of output is approximately equal in both the full information
and the hidden effort models, consistent with the empirical finding that output
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Table 1.12: Benchmark Model Moments: Quality of Signal
Hidden action Partially informative signal Full information
σ(y) 0.067 0.066 0.063
σ(a) 0.252 0.186 0.159
σ(a′) 0.169 0.158 0
ρ(a, y) 0.377 0.182 -0.468
ρ(a′, y) 0.518 0.420 0
ρ(e, y) 0.150 0.069 0.021
volatility is similar in countries with strong and weak institutions. However, aid
flows are more volatile in the models with hidden effort. In the data, aid is also
more volatile in countries with weak institutions, but not to the degree predicted
by the model.
Table 1.12 examines the impact of the informativeness of the signal about
government actions on the model moment. The key result is that with partially
informative signals the moments are between the two extremes of information. With
a partially informative signal ρ(a, y) = 0.182 which is between the values with
hidden actions and full information. Therefore, the model can potentially explain
the negative relationship between institutional transparency and the correlation
between aid and GDP from Figure 1.1.
1.6.4 Matching Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Dynamics
Section 1.2 showed that there are important differences between bilateral and
multilateral aid flows. Bilateral flows show a strong negative relationship between
institutions and the aid disbursement-GDP correlation but show no relationship
between institutions and the correlation between aid commitments and GDP. On
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Table 1.13: Model Moments to Match Bilateral and Multilateral Aid
Full information Hidden action
β = 0 β = 0.7 β = 0.9
σ(y) 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.065
σ(a) 0.159 0.468 0.252 0.143
σ(w′) 0 0 0.011 0.013
ρ(a, y) -0.468 0.921 0.377 0.037
ρ(w′, y) 0 0 0.518 0.554
ρ(e, y) 0.021 0.019 0.150 0.152
the other hand, multilateral flows show a weaker negative relationship between in-
stitutional transparency and the aid disbursement-GDP correlation but a strong
negative correlation between institutional transparency and the correlation between
aid commitments and GDP. If we allow the discount rates of bilateral and multilat-
eral donors to differ, the model can explain the different cyclical properties of aid
flows observed in the data.
The cyclical properties of bilateral aid flows in the data can be matched by
the model by shutting down the mechanism which makes GDP outcomes in period t
affect expected aid for period t+1. This can be achieved by making bilateral donors
myopic (setting β = 0). There is some evidence for this explanation in the data.
Table 1.6 shows that bilateral donors use aid commitments to try to stabilise
countries which have had coups. However, the model does not model the desire of
bilateral donors to use aid commitments to stabilise countries which have coups,
instead the model only uses aid commitments to encouraging good actions in coun-
tries with opaque institutions. Therefore, to capture an alternative use of aid com-
mitments which is not explicitly modelled, I can shut down the aid commitment
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instrument in the model by setting β = 0.
Table 1.13 shows that the model with hidden action and myopia has a stronger
positive correlation between aid and GDP compared to the benchmark hidden action
model. This corresponds to the finding in the data showing that bilateral donors
have a stronger negative relationship between institutions and the correlation be-
tween aid and GDP than multilateral donors.
The moments from multilateral aid can be matched by making the donor
less impatient. Table 1.13 shows that the correlation between aid and GDP gets
close to zero if β = 0.9. Therefore, increasing β makes the negative slope between
institutions and the correlation between aid disbursements and GDP almost zero
while still maintaining the negative slope between institutions and the correlation
between aid commitments and GDP. For very low discount rates, the donor only
uses aid promises to encourage effort and does not use actual aid disbursements.
1.6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
This section conducts sensitivity analysis to study how the benchmark hid-
den effort model’s quantitative predictions change when baseline parameters are
changed. Table 1.14 shows the results.
Decreasing the marginal cost of aid, φ from 1 to 0.8 increases both the cor-
relation of aid disbursements and commitments with GDP and the volatility of aid
from the baseline. Because the marginal cost of aid is lower, more aid is given in
high output states to encourage effort.
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Table 1.14: Sensitivity Analysis
Corr(a, y) Corr(w′, y) Corr(e, y) SD(a) SD(y) SD(w′)
Baseline 0.377 0.518 0.150 0.252 0.065 0.011
φ = 0.8 0.454 0.565 0.356 0.232 0.074 0.012
χ = 0.3 0.419 0.561 0.379 0.188 0.075 0.012
θ = 0.52 0.238 0.493 0.166 0.329 0.068 0.010
α = 0.6 0.340 0.545 0.143 0.245 0.065 0.012
σ = 0.85 0.512 0.508 0.125 0.275 0.065 0.011
δ = 0.85 0.374 0.506 0.160 0.227 0.067 0.011
β = 0.5 0.382 0.493 0.144 0.221 0.066 0.010
β = 0.9 0.037 0.554 0.152 0.143 0.065 0.013
β = 0 0.921 0 0.019 0.468 0.063 0
Increasing the weight on the cost of effort in the utility function χ from 0.2
to 0.3 increases the correlation between aid and GDP and the correlation between
aid commitments and GDP. Because the cost of effort is higher for the recipient
government, the donor must use the incentive mechanism of procyclical aid more
strongly to encourage recipient government effort.
As the weight θ on the utility of the rich in the recipient government preferences
increases from 0.5 to 0.52, the correlation between aid and GDP decreases relative
to the benchmark. This is because the government has more incentive to choose
higher effort, so that the donor does not need to use the incentive mechanism so
strongly to encourage effort. This result is somewhat counterintuitive, in that one
might think that a government that places a higher weight on the favoured subgroup
would require a greater incentive to choose effort that benefits the poor.
Increasing the curvature parameter on consumption σ from 0.8 to 0.85 causes
the correlation between aid and GDP to increase, while the correlation between aid
commitments and GDP decreases. The decrease in the correlation of aid commit-
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ments and GDP is a direct result of the greater need to smooth the consumption of
the poor over time given that they are more risk averse. However, in order to simul-
taneously maintain incentives for effort for the government, the correlation between
disbursed aid and GDP increases.
Decreasing the discount rate of the donor, β from 0.7 to 0.5 has very little
impact on the correlation between aid and GDP and the correlation between aid
commitments and GDP. Once the donors have a β > 0 they use aid commitments
and disbursements by a roughly similar degree to encourage effort. However, moving
β closer to one does have a significant impact on the model moments. Also table
1.14 show that for β = 0.9 the correlation between aid and GDP decreases to almost
zero. All the incentive effects are being generated by changes in aid commitments.
At the other extreme setting β = 0, only uses aid disbursements to encourage effort.
Finally increasing the returns to aid α from 0.5 to 0.6 causes the correlation
between aid and GDP to decrease, as each unit of aid goes further in terms of
creating incentives.
1.6.6 Hidden effort with countercyclical aid
The optimal aid policy with hidden effort is to reward high output states
with more aid in order to encourage more effort. This section analyses the impact
on welfare from forcing donors to give countercyclical aid to countries with weak
institutions, as suggested by Pallage, Robe and Berube (2006).
When effort is not observable and aid is not conditioned on observable output,
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Table 1.15: Welfare analysis: Aid to GDP ratios required to give the same utility
to the poor, with optimal and countercyclical aid
Aid to GDP ratio
Optimal Aid Countercyclical aid
6.1% 13.2%
10% 19.1%
the recipient government will exert the autarky level of effort. This is because the
government is not rewarded for high output states, so it has no incentive to choose
costly actions which increase the probability of high output states over the autarky
effort level. Figure 1.14 plots the welfare of the donor from the optimal aid policy
and the welfare from the optimal aid policy conditional on aid being non-procyclical.
There is a welfare loss to the donor of around 8% from following countercyclical aid
policies, for the empirically relevant region of promise utility.
I compute a compensated variation measure of welfare to give metric of the
welfare costs of giving countercyclical aid to countries with opaque institutions.
Table 1.15 shows the aid to GDP ratio required to give the poor the same level
of welfare under the two policies. If a country has a 6.1% aid to GDP ratio (the
average of below median transparency) the countercyclical aid policy requires the
aid to GDP ratio to more than double in order to give the poor the same welfare.
For an aid to GDP ratio of 10% the aid to GDP ratio required to deliver the same
level of welfare is slight less than double at 19.1%.
This model suggests that giving countercyclical aid to countries with opaque
institutions would actually be welfare reducing rather than welfare improving, and
49
that it would be substantially more costly for the donor provide a given level of
welfare to the poor under countercyclical policy. This is because the welfare benefits
of smoothing out business cycle fluctuations is small relative to the welfare loss from
the government exerting lower effort.
1.6.7 Explaining Outliers
Figure 1.15 shows that there are four data points where countries with opaque
institutions received countercylical/acyclical aid instead of procyclical aid. The four
outlying observations are Guyana, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Haiti all from
the Early (1976-1989) sample period. The interaction between the political and
altruistic reasons for giving aid provide a plausible explanation for these countries
being outliers.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, recently released CIA records reveal
that in 1963 John F. Kennedy ordered the CIA to destabilise the first democrati-
cally elected government of Guyana which was led by the socialist leaning Cheddi
Jagan (Waters and Daniel, 2005). The actions by the US government in Guyana
caused a diplomatic rift between the US and the UK government of Harold Wilson.
The UK was keen to maintain influence in Guyana and provided countercyclical
aid for political purposes despite the poor governance record during this period.
Countercyclical ODA to the Philippines is another example of the conflict between
political and altruistic motives for giving aid. Despite the poor governance record
during Ferdinand Marcos’ regime, because of important US military bases in the
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Countries where the average of ICRG corruption, rule of law and expropriation score less than 2
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Philippines it was important for the US to maintain good ties with Marcos. Not
only did the Philippines receive countercyclical aid, Marcos visited the White House
on several occasions. Furthermore, all the outlying observations in the ellipse in Fig-
ure 1.15 are from the Cold War sample period. The competition between the West
and the Soviet Union often resulted in aid allocations decisions which were strongly
influenced by political motives.
Figure 1.16 illustrates how political promises affect optimal aid policy in the
model. As the political promise, w0, increases aid becomes less procyclical; eventu-
ally becoming countercyclical for very high w0. Because the political use of aid gives
utility to the government. The altruistic donor is only able to satisfy the political
constraint w0 by giving less procyclical aid but this implies that the altruistic donor
is unable to extract high levels of effort from the government. To reach the highest
feasible w0 the altruistic donor is unable to extract any effort from the government
and uses aid to smooth out downturns.
Figure 1.16 also implies that opaque countries which receive countercyclical
aid also receive more aid ceteris paribus. There is some evidence for this, for example
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Table 1.16 regresses the aid/GDP ratio against the correlation between aid and GDP
while controlling for the level of GDP in the country for countries which have an
institutional opacity score of 2 or below.17 The sign on the correlation is negative,
but is not significant.
Today it is possible to see a similar episodes occurring. For example in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, there is pressure on Western donors to disburse
aid despite evidence that governance is getting worse, due to the competition with
China over access to the DRC’s vast natural resources (The Economist, March 13th
2008, “China’s quest for resources”). Thus the model provides a natural way to
understand the interaction between the political and altruistic motives for giving
development aid.
1.7 Conclusion
I have investigated why some countries receive procyclical ODA while others
receive countercyclical ODA. I showed that the donor’s ability to monitor the effort
of the aid recipient government affects the cyclicality of aid using a case study and
empirical results discussed at greater length in Banerjee (2009). In countries where
government effort is transparent, aid is acyclical or countercyclical, while in countries
where government effort is opaque, aid is procyclical.
I show that a dynamic model in which donor’s use aid to elicit government
effort can quantitatively explain many of the stylised facts of aid cyclicality. The
17The institutional opacity scores are between 0 and 6 with 0 being the most opaque.
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model can explain why countries with transparent institutions receive countercycli-
cal aid while countries with opaque institutions receive procyclical aid. The model
is also consistent with the fact that the level of aid is uncorrelated with institutional
quality.
The main failing of the model is that it predicts that the volatility of aid de-
clines as institutions become more transparent. In the data, there is no relationship
between aid volatility and institutional transparency. This result could be related
to Celasun and Walliser (2008), who find that aid is unpredictable in countries with
stable relationships with donors. The correlation between aid commitments and
GDP is also too high in the model. Because aid commitments are measured in gross
terms while the model measure is for net aid commitments, this shortcoming could
potentially be due to the data. However, it could also be due to the assumption
in the model of i.i.d shocks. If the conditional distributions functions for output
were affected by persistent shocks, there would be a motive for donors to use aid
commitments as insurance over persistent negative shocks, which would decrease
the positive correlation between aid commitments and GDP for all countries, trans-
parent and opaque.
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Figure 1.1: Total aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
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Figure 1.2: Multilateral aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
















Figure 1.3: Bilateral aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
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Commitments - Pooled data
Figure 1.4: Multilateral commitments: Institutions plot against ρ(aidt+1, GDPt)
































































Figure 1.5: Malawi: GDP and ODA series with HP trend
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Figure 1.6: The Democratic Republic of the Congo: GDP and ODA series with HP
trend
































Figure 1.7: Optimal aid policy: Full information
Solid line: high output states, Dashed line: low output states
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Figure 1.8: Effort: Full information
















Figure 1.9: Donor utility: Full information
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Figure 1.10: Optimal aid policy: Hidden action
Solid line: high output states, Dashed line: low output states













Figure 1.11: Effort: Hidden action
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Figure 1.12: Promised utility: Hidden action
Solid line: high output states, Dashed line: low output states


































Figure 1.13: Promised aid: Hidden action
Solid line: high output states, Dashed line: low output states
63




















Figure 1.14: Donor utility, optimal vs. countercyclical aid


















Figure 1.15: Explaining Outliers: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
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requires less procyclical aid









Figure 1.16: Explaining Outliers: Optimal aid policy with hidden action
Solid line: high output states, Dashed line: low output states
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Chapter 2
New Evidence on the Relationship Between Aid Cyclicality and
Institutions
2.1 Introduction
Why do some countries receive countercyclical aid while others receive pro-
cyclical aid? This paper documents a new fact which sheds new light on this ques-
tion: the correlation between official development assistance (ODA) and GDP is
negatively related to the quality of institutions in that country. As the quality
of institutions in a country deteriorate, they are more likely to receive procyclical
rather than countercyclical aid. In particular institutional measures related to cor-
ruption, rule of law, property rights, quality of the public sector and government
transparency display a robust negative correlation with aid procylicality.
The previous empirical literature which analysed the links between institu-
tional quality and aid only considered the relationship between level of aid and
institutions (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002). They found al-
most no relationship between institutional quality and the level of aid a country
received, instead they found that the level of aid a country receives is determined
by political or colonial interests. This paper provides evidence that donors do dif-
ferentiate aid flows based on the quality of institutions in a country. However, they
differentiate aid on the cyclicality dimension rather than the level. In particular,
donors differentiate the timing of aid flows based on the institutional quality of a
government.
The relationship between institutional quality and the cyclicality of aid also
reconciles conflicting empirical results about the properties of aid cyclicality in the
literature. Pallage and Robe (2001) find aid to be procyclical in two thirds of African
economies and half of non-African developing countries. They conclude that aid is
predominantly procyclical and that Africa is perhaps treated differently than non-
African developing countries. This paper shows that Africa is not treated differently
by donors once institutional quality is accounted for. The greater incidence of
procyclical aid in Africa is driven by the fact that the average quality of institutions
in Africa is lower than in non-African developing economies.
Using a different sample, Rand and Tarp (2002) find no evidence that aid is
procyclical in developing countries. Their result appears to be at odds with Pallage
and Robe’s (2001) finding of predominantly procyclical aid. This paper shows that
the sample in Rand and Tarp (2002), comprises developing countries which have
relatively good institutions compared to the average developing country.1 The em-
pirical finding from this paper suggests such countries with good institutions should
receive acyclical or countercyclical aid. Once institutional quality is accounted for,
the Rand and Tarp (2002) sample is not treated differently than other developing
1Rand and Tarp (2002) chose to analyse developing countries which have long time-series of
data. Historically countries with good institutions have produced national accounts data for longer,
therefore, the desire to compute the cyclical properties of aid from long-time series data lend to
Rand and Tarp (2002) choosing countries with better institutions.
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countries. Thus the empirical findings of predominantly procyclical aid in Pallage
and Robe (2001) and acyclical and countercyclical aid in Rand and Tarp (2002) are
consistent with each other once institutional quality in their samples are accounted
for.
The new empirical regularity documented in this paper directly addresses the
policy debate about whether aid flows are welfare inefficient and destabilising in
developing countries (Bulir and Hamann, 2003; Pallage, Robe and Berube, 2006;
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2007, Arellano, Bulir, Lane and Lipschitz, 2009). Be-
cause the costs of business cycles in developing countries are substantially greater
than in developed countries (Pallage and Robe, 2003), the ability of households in
developing countries to smooth their consumption is very important. However, in-
struments used by developed economies to smooth aggregate shocks, e.g. access to
international capital markets and foreign direct investment (FDI), are either cutoff
or reduced during downturns in many developing countries and for the poorest coun-
tries both are virtually non-existent. Thus aid becomes an important instrument for
developing countries to finance their current accounts. This observation prompted a
number of papers to suggest that welfare in developing countries could be improved
if aid flows were countercyclical or less volatile (Bulir and Hamann, 2001; Pallage,
Robe and Berube, 2006, Arellano, Bulir, Lane and Lipschitz, 2009).
This paper shows that conditional on having good institutions, aid does act
as insurance for developing countries during downturns. This is exactly the policy
advice from Pallage, Robe and Berube (2006). Furthermore, the fact that the pro-
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cyclicality of aid increases as the quality of institutions deteriorates suggests that
donors systematically differentiate aid flows between developing countries and pro-
cyclical aid is a concious decision on the part of donors. In Banerjee (2010) I show
that moral hazard concerns can make it optimal for donors to give procyclical aid
if donors cannot monitor government actions. However, if government actions are
observable it is optimal to give countercyclical aid to smooth out economic fluctua-
tions. Thus observability of government actions can explain why countries with good
institutions tend to receive countercyclical aid while countries with weak institutions
receive procyclical aid. The model presented in Banerjee (2010) can quantitatively
explain many of the empirical results in this paper.
The paper is closest to Pallage and Robe (2001), Rand and Tarp (2002) and
Bulir and Hamann (2003) who examine the business cycle properties of aid. This
paper extends their analysis by analysing how institutional quality in a country
affects the cyclical properties of aid flows a country receives.
Section 2.2 examines the empirical relationship between aid, GDP and insti-
tutions. Section 2.3 examines how the relationship between institutions and aid
cyclicality can reconcile previous empirical studies of aid cyclicality. Section 2.4
examines the phase shift of this relationship, section 2.5 examines aid cyclicality
from individual bilateral donors, section 2.6 analyses the relationship between the
cyclicality of aid commitments and institutions. Finally section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Some new stylised facts on the relationship between aid and GDP
The data set is composed of annual data from 1974 to 2007. A country is ex-
cluded if it is not in Africa, Asia, South America, the Carribean or Central America.
A recipient country is also excluded from the sample if it had not achieved inde-
pendence by the end of 1975. Furthermore, countries are dropped if aid or national
accounts data are unavailable prior to 1988. Countries also dropped due to country
coverage of institutional quality measures. The final sample for the main regression
results reported here consists of 61 developing countries (see Table 2.1).
2.2.1 Data
I measure actual aid flows using the total net Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) disbursement figures published by the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). The OECD measure of aid includes the value of grants and con-
cessional loans.2 I convert the aid data into per capita units using total population
figures from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The aid per
capita series are deflated by the purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP deflators from
the Penn World Tables3 prior to 2000 and thereafter using the WDI GDP PPP de-
flators. I also examine total ODA commitments. ODA commitments are an official
pledge (i.e. with parliamentary backing) for aid to be disbursed at some point in
2Loans must have a concessional nature to qualify as ODA. For example IMF standby agreement
credits are not considered ODA because they are given at interest rates sufficiently close to market
rates.
3PWT 6.2 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2,
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
sylvania, September 2006
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the future. It is not possible to construct a directly equivalent measure of ODA
commitments to net ODA disbursements.4
I report results for total aid, which is the sum of multilateral and bilateral
aid. I also report results for multilateral aid, total bilateral aid and bilateral aid by
donor country. Table 2.2 lists the major bilateral donors. Bilateral donors contribute
approximately two thirds of ODA and multilateral donors one third.
GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). All series are deflated by the purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP deflators
from the Penn World Tables prior to 2000 and thereafter using the WDI PPP
deflators. Capital flow data are also taken from the WDI. Capital flows are measured
as the sum of net foreign direct investment (FDI), equity investment portfolio flows
and portfolio investment bond flows to both the private and government sectors.
To compute the cyclical properties of aid and GDP per capita, I take natural
logarithms of the per capita PPP series and compute the detrended series as the
difference between the data and the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. I then drop the
end points from the detrended series. From now on, when I refer to aid or GDP, I
refer to detrended aid and detrended GDP unless otherwise specified. For my main
results I use a weighting parameter of 10, as suggested by Baxter and King (1995)
for annual data. The results are also relatively robust to using the Baxter-King
(1999) band-pass filter as an alternative filtering mechanism.5 Following Pallage
4Celasun and Walliser (2008) provide a detailed statistical analysis of the relationship between
gross ODA commitments and disbursements. They find that commitments are predictors of dis-
bursements, but a large unexplained component remains.
5For the Band-Pass filter I use window of 3 leads and lags, a low frequency of 3 and high
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and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2003) I measure the procyclicality of aid
by computing the correlation between detrended aid and detrended GDP.
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 plot the raw GDP and ODA data, fitted HP trends
and the deviations from trend for Malawi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
and Uganda. Malawi has clearly received countercyclical aid flows since 1976 with
increases of aid often occuring during downturns and vice versa. On the other
hand, the DRC clearly received strongly procyclical aid. Finally, Uganda received
procyclical aid during the 1980s but from the early 1990s aid flows became more
countercyclical.
I measure institutions using a number of different measures. The Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings provide the longest time series with
broad country coverage starting in 1982 with further improvements in the cover-
age of developing countries in 1985. The ICRG provides quantitative assessments of
countries provided by a group of unidentified private experts not necessarily resident
in the country. For the main results, I use the mean of scores from (a) corruption,
(b) rule of law/law and order tradition and (c) private expropriation risk as my
main measure of institutional quality. I also report results for the individual series.6
A higher score implies higher quality institutions.7
frequency of 8.
6I re-scale the private exproptiation risk scores onto a [0,6] scale to conform with the scale of
the corruption and rule of law scores.
7These measures of institutions come from Knack and Keefer (1995) who used the underlying
ICRG data to construct the IRIS 3 dataset which measures: corruption, ethnic tension, rule of law,
quality of bureaucracy, repudiation of government contracts and expropriation risk. Since Knack
and Keefer (1995) these measures of institutions have been used in many studies e.g. Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) to analyse the impact of institutions on economic development and
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005) to explain why capital does not flow from rich to
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Between 1989 and 1994, the institutional quality measures in my sample ex-
perienced a historically high amount of churning. Figure 2.4 plots the correlation
of the cross section of the rule of law measure against the cross section two years
ahead. During the period from 1989 to 1994, the two-year ahead correlation drops
from values of greater than 0.90 to 0.66.8. A potential explanation for this churning
is that at the end of the cold war, developing countries were no-longer able to play
off the Western donors against the USSR and hence Western donors were able to
extract greater changing in governance in return for aid.9 In this paper, I exploit
this variation by splitting the sample in 1991 and compute the correlation between
aid and GDP in each subsample, the sample prior to 1991 I denote as ‘early’ and
post 1991 as ‘late’. This historically higher degree of churning coincides with a step
increase in in average institutional quality across my sample which has not been
repeated since (Figure 2.5).
As a robustness check, I use alternative measures of institutions from other
sources. I first cross check my results using institutional measures from Kaufmann
and Kraay (2008). These measures have broader country coverage than the ICRG
data, but have the disadvantage of a shorter time series, which only starts in 1996.
Second, I use the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
measures which have the advantage of measuring more specific aspects of institutions
but with the disadvantage that published figures are only available from 2005 and
poor countries.
8Even though my sample does not contain any Eastern Bloc countries, the end of the cold war
does appear to coincide with this one-off change in institutional quality.
9In Banerjee (2010) I show how the interaction between political vs altruistic motives for giving
aid can affect the ability of the donor to extract better policies from the recipient government.
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for a narrower set of developing economies than the ICRG.
The methodology controls for the impact of the OECD business cycle on aid
flows. During any window over which the correlation between aid and GDP is
computed, the donors are facing the same shocks but some countries receive pro-
cyclical aid while others receive countercyclical aid. There are a multitude of other
macroeconomic, political economy and institutional variables which could poten-
tially explain the correlation of ODA flows with GDP. I use the following control
variables to test the robustness of the results: GDP per capita because once GDP
per capita is accounted for, Alesina and Weder (2002) find that institutional quality
in a country does not affect the level of aid a country receives. I control for the aid
to GDP ratio and aid as a fraction of capital flows because aid inflows could poten-
tially cause a boom, and this effect will be greatest for those countries where aid is
most important, either in terms of GDP or as a fraction of capital flows.10 I also
control for the volatility of aid, the volatility of GDP and the volatility of real terms
of trade shocks defined by Mendoza (1992). The political structure of a country or
conflicts and coups may potentially affect aid flows. To control for this I use data on
the political system from Polity IV, armed conflicts from the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset and the coups from the Center for Systemic Peace, Coups d’Etat
dataset. To isolate the particular institutional characteristic which influences aid
flows I also control for measures of civil liberties and political rights. I take mea-
sures of civil liberties and political rights from the Freedom House, Freedom in the
10Reducing the sample to those countries where ODA is greater than capital flows does not
change the results.
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World dataset. Crises could also influence aid flows, I therefore follow Drazen and
Easterly (2001) to construct measures of inflation crises. Finally, one should note
that similar to the growth regression literature there are an infinite number of right
hand side variables that one could consider but only a finite number of degrees of
freedom.
2.2.2 Empirical tests
I run three different regressions to test the relationship between the cyclicality
of aid and institutional quality.
2.2.2.1 Pooled regression
The first regression pools data from the early and late periods and treats
between country variation of institutional quality identically to within country vari-
ation over the early and late sample periods
corr(aidt, gdps)n,i = α + βInstitutionsn,i +Xn,iη + εn,i (2.1)
where corr(aidt, gdps)n,i is the correlation between detrended aid in year t
and detrended gdp in year s over the sample period n = {early, late} for country i.
Institutionsn,i is the institutional measure for country i in sample period n. Xn,i is
a vector of country characteristics, α and β are constants, η is a vector of constants
and εn,i is white noise. I denote regression (2.1) as the ‘pooled’ regression.
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2.2.2.2 Within regression
The second regression is a two way error component model which controls
for both country and time fixed effects. Fixed effects control for variables such
as colonial past which Alesina and Dollar find to be important determinants of
the level of aid a country receives. Since I have only two periods, pre and post
the end of the cold war this regression is equivalent testing whether the change in
institutional quality between the two sample periods is correlated with the change
in corr(aidt, gdps).
corr(aidt, gdps)n,i = αi + βInstitutionsn,i + λT imen +Xn,iη + εn,i (2.2)
where αi and λ are constants and Timen is a time dummy variable for period
n. The Timen dummy is important because this controls for the trend increase in
institutional quality shown in Figure (2.5). In this regression I am exploiting the
unusually high degree of ‘churning’ in institutional quality at the end of the cold
war. I denote regression (2.2) as the ‘within’ regression because it tests whether the
impact of changes in institutional quality within a country are significant, controlling
for country and time fixed effects.
2.2.2.3 Between regression
Finally, for completeness I test whether between country variation in institu-
tional quality is an important determinant of aid cyclicality by running the following
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regression










where corr(aidt, gdpt)i is the mean of corr(aidt, gdpt)n,i over the two periods
n. I denote regression (2.3) as the ‘between’ regression. Due to the averaging over
time in the between regression, has fewer degrees of freedom compared to the pooled
and within regressions.
2.2.3 ODA disbursements
Figure 2.6 plots the contemporaneous correlation of total net disbursed ODA
and GDP computed over the two subsamples against the mean of the corruption,
the rule of law and expropriation risk of private investment indices from the ICRG.
For the early period I use the earliest complete set of observations which are 1985
due to data availability and for the late sample the 1993 observation.11. The inverse
relationship between the quality of institutions and the correlation of ODA disburse-
ments and GDP is clear. To the best of my knowledge this is the first time this fact
has been documented. In countries with the most procyclical aid, the correlation is
around 0.90, ranging down to -0.55 for the least. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 plot the same
graph for multilateral and bilateral ODA disbursements respectively. The inverse
relationship between institutions and the aid-GDP correlation is still evident.
11The results are robust to using averages over the 1985-1991 and 1992 onwards instead of the
1985 and 1993 observations.
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Table 2.3 regresses the contemporaneous correlation of detrended total net
ODA disbursements and detrended GDP against the quality of institutions in a
country. The significant negative coefficient in all specifications shows that as insti-
tutional quality improves, countries receive less procyclical aid. This results holds
for the pooled, within and between regression specifications. The estimated β co-
efficients from the three specifications not significantly different from each other
suggesting that the influence of institutional quality on the cyclicality of aid are
similar for both within and between country variation. The within regression re-
sults show that fixed effects such as colonial past or distance from the equator are
not explanations for this correlation.
Countries which had relatively poor institutions in the 1970s, but improved
them by the 1990s (e.g. Ghana and Uganda) had a high correlation between aid and
GDP in the 1970s and early 1980s however, they had a relatively low correlation in
the 1990s and beyond. On the other side, countries which had relatively good insti-
tutions in the 1970s and early 1980s but the quality declined thereafter (e.g. Sierra
Leone) showed the opposite trend. Countries which had poor institutions through-
out had a high correlation between aid and GDP in all decades (e.g. Democratic
Republic of Congo), while countries with relatively good institutions throughout
had a low correlation between aid and GDP in all decades (e.g. Malawi). The
results predict that if the Democratic Republic of the Congo improved its institu-
tional quality to that of Ghana in 1993, aid would go from being strongly procyclical
(Corr(Aid,GDP ) = 0.48) to acyclical (Corr(Aid,GDP ) = 0.061).
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Table 2.4 shows that the relationship between aid cyclicality and institutional
quality is robust to all the control variables across both the pooled and within
regression specifications, but not the between specification. This illustrates that the
change in institutional quality over time is an important source of variation when
explaining the cyclicality of aid flows. In terms of possible control variables, the
model of Arellano et al. (2009) suggests that countries which receive volatile aid
flows and aid flows are a significant fraction of GDP or a significant fraction of
capital flows, there should be a positive correlation with aid procyclicality. Table
2.4 shows that the volatility of aid is not significant in any specification, that the
aid to GDP ratio is significant only in the between specification and capital flows
as a fraction of aid is never significant. This result is in line with the empirical
results in Pallage and Robe (2001) and Bulir and Hamann (2003), who do not find
a significant relationship between the cyclicality of aid and the aid to GDP ratio,
the volatility of aid and the volatility of GDP. There is also no relationship between
the cyclicality of aid and the level of GDP in a country which is line with results
in Pallage and Robe (2001). Table (2.4) also shows that the aid to GDP ratio and
the volatility of GDP are positively correlated with aid procyclicality but this result
only holds for the between regression specification.
Alternatively, aid flows could be affected by armed conflicts or coups, which
also cause reductions in GDP. For the within regression specification, if a country
experienced armed conflict in one period, then in that period they received more
countercyclical aid. However, armed conflicts are not significant in the pooled or
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between regressions. Dollar and Svensson (2000) find evidence that the political
structure in a country temporarily affects aid flows. I therefore, use the Polity IV
scores to test whether the political structure affects aid. This variable is also not
significant. Measures of civil liberties or political rights used by Isham, Kaufmann
and Pritchett (1997) to explain the success of development projects are also not
significant. These results accord with the a priori expectation in Banerjee (2010)
where the domestic political system should not affect the donors’ ability to monitor
government actions or affect the credibility of announced policies. Finally, monetary
crises as measured by Drazen and Easterly (2001) could cause to aid fall in times of
crisis as donor targets are missed. Again these crisis variables are not significant.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that countries with more corruption, weaker rule of
law and greater expropriation risk of private investment receive more procyclical aid
on average. As these institutions improve, aid becomes acyclical or countercyclical
on average. This result is robust to numerous control variables and regression spec-
ifications. For countries with good institutions, aid does acts as insurance during
downturns or is at least acyclical. This relationship suggests that at the business
cycle level, aid flows are influenced by the quality of these institutions in recipient
countries. This is a striking finding given that the previous literature failed to find
any relationship between the level of aid and the quality of institutions in a coun-
try (World Bank, 1998, Dollar and Svensson, 2000, Alesina and Dollar, 2000 and
Alesina and Weder, 2002).
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2.2.3.1 Alternative detrending filter
The HP-filter is known to potentially induce cycles in acyclical data. There-
fore I use an alternative detrending technique to test the robustness of the results.
Tables 2.5 and 2.4 present results using a band-pass filter (Baxter and King 1999).
Detrending with the Band-Pass filter there is still a negative relationship between
institutions and aid procyclicality. The results are robust to individually adding the
controls (not shown) but with all controls simultaneously, institutions only remain
significant in the Within regression (Table 2.6).12 For the pooled regression none of
the controls are significant either. In the between regression, countries which have
had on average more volatile GDP receive more procyclical aid. This is consistent
with the results in Table 2.4.
2.2.3.2 Multilateral and Bilateral Aid
The results presented above are for total aid flows. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 break
down aid flows into flows from multilateral and bilateral donors. Tables 2.8 and 2.8
show a similar negative relationship between institutional quality in a country and
the procyclicality of aid. Table 2.9 shows that for total bilateral aid all regression
specifications are negative and significant at the 5% level. However, the negative
relationship between aid cyclicality and institutional quality is not robust for mul-
tilateral aid. On the other hand, below I show that the relationship between the
cyclicality of multilateral aid commitments is significant, but not for total bilateral
12For the pooled regression with controls the P-value on institutional quality equals 0.1017.
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aid commitments. In Banerjee (2010) I show that the differing behaviour of aid
cyclicality between multilateral vs. bilateral donors can be attributed to conflict be-
tween altruistic and political reasons for giving aid. If there are frequent stochastic
political motives for giving aid, this limits the ability to use aid commitments to
influence recipient government behaviour and instead variation in actual aid flows
are instead used to influence recipient government behaviour.
2.2.3.3 Individual institutional quality measures
Table 2.10 shows that for the pooled regression model, all series except Ethnic
Tension show a significant negative correlation between institutional quality and the
correlation of detrended aid and GDP. With controls only Corruption and Expro-
priation of private investment remain significant. Table 2.11 shows the results for
total multilateral and total bilateral aid flows. For Bilateral aid flows, Corruption,
Expropriation of Private Investment and Rule of Law are all negative and significant
in the regressions with controls.
The results from Table 2.10 and Table 2.4 show that several institutional qual-
ity variables have a strong negative relationship between institutional quality and
the correlation between detrended aid and GDP. This suggests that there is proba-
bly a latent variable which influences the timing of donor aid flows and that variable
is partially captured by the individual institutional quality variables. In Banerjee
(2010) I argue using a case study that this latent variable is the donor’s ability
to monitor government actions and hence differentiate exogenous from endogenous
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downturns.
2.2.4 Alternative institutional quality measures
As a further robustness check and also to learn more about the particular
institutions driving this relationship, I use the 1996 Kaufmann and Kraay (2008)
governance indicators and the 2006 World Bank CPIA institutional quality mea-
sures as alternatives to the measure constructed from the ICRG. The Kaufmann
and Kraay (2008) indicators have the advantage of broader country coverage, 71 as
opposed to 61 for the ICRG given the sample selection process. The CPIA indicators
have the benefit of more specific measures of institutions but has narrower country
coverage, 37 as opposed to 61 for the ICRG. Countries in the CPIA sample tend to
have lower GDP per capita because they tend to be World Bank International De-
velopment Association (IDA) countries which provides aid to the poorest countries.
Unfortunately both these measures have relatively short time series. The Kaufmann
and Kraay data start in 1996 while the publicly available CPIA data start in 2005
thus both miss the large ‘churning’ at the end of the cold war. I therefore only
compute regressions for the ‘Late’ sample period for these measures.
Table 2.12 show results from the pooled regression specifications for the in-
dividual institutional measures from Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) and the CPIA.
For the Kaufmann and Kraay indicators political stability and control of corrup-
tion are significant in the regressions with the control variables. Tables 2.13 and
Table ?? show that government effectiveness is negative and significant for multilat-
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eral and bilateral aid flows while bilateral aid flows also show a significant negative
relationship with voice and accountability and political stability.
For the CPIA measures Tables 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 show that the Public Sector
Management cluster, Structural Policies cluster are negative and significantly cor-
related with aid cyclicality for total and multilateral aid flows. Out of the 4 main
CPIA clusters, policies for social exclusion and equity shows the weakest relation-
ship. The fit is particularly good for the Public Sector Management and Institutions
cluster. Therefore, countries with better Public sector management and institutions
receive less procyclical aid. Examining the more specific CPIA indicators, revenue
management appears to be an important factor in determining the cyclicality of aid.
2.2.5 Aid Levels
This section confirm the results of Alesina and Weder (2002) who find that the
level of aid a country receives is not influenced by the quality of institutions in that
country. In Table 2.15 I confirm these results using my dataset. The regressions show
that once GDP per capita is controlled for, institutions are no longer a significant
explanatory variable for the level of aid. The fact that institutions do not influence
the level of aid is an important fact that any model which attempts to explain aid
cyclicality must reproduce.
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2.3 Reconciling the existing empirical literature on aid cyclicality
This section shows that the relationship between institutional quality and aid
cyclicality can reconcile some conflicting results in the existing literature on aid
cyclicality.
Pallage and Robe (2001) find that 71% of sub-Saharan African economies
receive procyclical aid while 48% of non-African developing countries receive pro-
cyclical aid. They conclude that,
‘Another message from these results is that Africa is special in many respects.
That region of the world is the one for which aid matters most. It is also the region
for which aid receipts are most often and most strongly procylical.’
Sub-Saharan Africa is also the region of the world with the weakest institu-
tions (Table (2.16).13 In sub-Saharan Africa the mean is 3.02 while in non-African
developing countries the mean is higher at 3.364. I conduct the following test to de-
termine is sub-Saharan Africa is treated differently than other developing countries
or whether the higher incidence of procyclical aid in Africa is due to having weaker
institutions on average. First, I run the following regression
corr(aidt, gdpt)n,i = α + θSubSaharan Africa dummy + εn,i (2.4)
where SubSaharan Africa dummy is an indicator variable for sub-Saharan
African countries in my sample and θ is a constant. This regression tests whether
13Institutional quality is measured as the mean of corruption, rule of law and expropriation risk
but this fact holds for other institutional measures too.
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sub-Saharan Africa receives more procylical aid on average. If it does, then θ will be
positive and significant. Table 2.17 shows that this is indeed the case. However, sub-
Saharan Africa could receive more procylical aid on average simply because it has
weaker institutions on average. I run the following regression to test this hypothesis
corr(aidt, gdpt)n,i = α+βInstitutionsn,i+θSubSaharanAfricadummy+εn,i (2.5)
If θ is no longer significant once the Institutions variable is included,then
sub-Saharan Africa is not treated differently conditional on institutional quality.
Table 2.17 indicates that the sub-Saharan Africa dummy is not significant once
one controls for institutional quality. Therefore, on average, sub-Saharan African
countries are not treated differently. Instead, sub-Saharan Africa has weaker insti-
tutions on average and thus receives more procyclical aid.
A similar test can be conducted when comparing the finding from Pallage and
Robe (2001) that aid is ‘predominantly’ procyclical to the findings from Rand and
Tarp (2002) where ‘[they] find no evidence of procyclical aid’. Table (2.16) shows
that the Rand and Tarp (2002) sample has countries with above average institutional
quality. The following regression tests whether the countries in the Rand and Tarp
(2002) sample receive more countercyclical aid than the other countries in my sample
corr(aidt, gdpt)n,i = α + θRand Tarp sample dummy + εn,i (2.6)
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where Rand Tarp sample dummy is an indicator variable for countries in the
Rand and Tarp (2002) sample and θ is a constant. The institutions variable is then
added to the regression. If the Rand and Tarp dummy variable is not significant
with the addition of the Institutions variable then the Rand and Tarp (2002) finding
is due to using a sample of countries with above average institutional quality
corr(aidt, gdpt)n,i = α+βInstitutionsn,i + θRandTarp sample dummy+ εn,i (2.7)
The first column of Table (2.18) shows that the Rand and Tarp (2002) sample
receives more countercyclical aid on average than the rest of the sample. How-
ever, once institutional quality is added, then the Rand Tarp sample dummy is no
longer significant. This result shows that Rand and Tarp’s (2002) result of ‘no evi-
dence for procyclical aid’ can be reconciled with Pallage and Robe (2001) result of
‘predominantly’ procyclical aid, once the quality of institutions in the samples are
considered. Indeed, Rand and Tarp (2002) chose developing countries which have
long time series of data. Countries which traditionally have better institutions tend
to have better national accounts data. By selecting countries with long times data,
Rand and Tarp (2002) selected a sample of developing countries which had higher
institutional quality.
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2.4 Leads and Lags of aid disbursements
Section 3.3 discussed the relationship between institutional quality and the
contemporaneous correlation between aid and GDP. This section examines the phase
shift of this relationship.
There is a similar relationship between the correlation between aid disburse-
ments in t − 1 and GDP in period t and institutions. In both Table 2.19 and 2.20
the institutions variable is negative and significant in all specifications. Therefore,
in countries with weak institutions, detrended aid leads GDP while in countries
with good institutions, aid flows increase before downturns in GDP. However, as
institutional quality improves, then the correlation between aid in t − 1 and GDP
in period t becomes more countercyclical.
Interestingly there is no significant relationship between corr(aidt+1, gdpt) and
institutions (not reported here).
2.5 Bilateral donors
In section 2.2 there was a significant negative relationship between aid cycli-
cality and institutions for bilateral donors. This section drills down deeper and
examines the cyclicality of aid flows for individual OECD donors. Table 2.21 shows
pooled regression results for all donors where aid flows comprise at least 1% of total
aid flows over my sample period. Aid flows from the United States, United King-
dom, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and
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Australia all show a negative relationship between aid cyclicality and institutional
quality. This negative relationship is robust to the control variables for the United
Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Belgium and Australia. Interestingly Italy
is alone in have a positive relationship between aid cyclicality and institutional qual-
ity and this positive relationship is robust to the control variables.
The cyclicality of aid flows from Scandinavian countries do not show a signif-
icant relationship with institutions. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that aid from
Scandinavia is directed to countries with the better institutions unlike other coun-
tries. Therefore, the lack of a significant relationship between institutional quality
and aid cyclicality could be because Scandinavian countries are already targeting the
level of aid to countries with good institutions and do not differentiate the cyclicality
of aid flows across institutional quality.
2.6 Aid commitments
The OECD’s aid data has an nice feature in that it not only collects infor-
mation about actual aid flows, aid disbursements, but also firm promises of aid for
the future, aid commitments. Celasun and Walliser (2008) examine the relationship
between aid commitments and aid disbursements. They find that aid commitments
are an unbiased forecast for aid disbursements but there is a large unexplained com-
ponent. This section tests whether there is a relationship between the cyclicality of
aid commitments and institutional quality.
In Banerjee (2010) I show that the negative relationship between aid cyclicality
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and institutional quality can be explained within a dynamic moral hazard frame-
work. One of the predictions from the model is that commitments for aid in the
future can also be used by donors as an instrument to encourage good policies. The
prediction states that aid commitments for the following year should also be pro-
cyclical in countries with weak institutions while countries with higher institutional
quality should have acyclical or countercyclical aid commitments.
Indeed for Multilateral aid, there is such link between institutional quality
and the correlation between GDP in year t and aid commitments for t + 1. Figure
2.9 plots the correlation between GDP in year t and aid commitment in year t + 1
and presents a negative relationship. Table 2.22 shows that the negative relationship
between institutional quality and the cyclicality of aid commitments in the next year
is significant for multilateral aid flows. Table 2.23 shows that the pooled and within
regressions are robust to the control variables. There is however, no relationship
between the cyclicality of Total aid and bilateral aid with institutional quality. In
Banerjee (2010) I show that this result can be explained if bilateral donors are
myopic, have a stochastic political demands for aid or the duration of relationships
with recipient countries are lower.
2.7 Causality
The results presented thus far only imply a correlation between institutional
quality and the cyclicality of aid flows, they do not necessarily imply causality. It is
possible that the causation could run from the cyclicality of aid flows to institutional
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quality in a country. However, this does not seem plausible. For example, if causality
did run in this direction, it would be very easy for donors to improve the quality
of institutions in a country. Donors could improve institutional quality by giving
countercyclical aid flows instead of procyclical aid. If changing institutional quality
in developing countries were so easy, it would surely have been considered by now.
It also seems unlikely that institutional quality measures would be influenced by
the donor community’s decision about the cyclicality of aid. I consider it highly
unlikely that assessments of institutional quality are determined by the cyclicality of
aid flows to the country. Furthermore in the main results I use the first observations
of institutional quality available in each subsample. Thus it is a stretch of the
imagination that institutional quality in 1993 would have been influenced by the
cyclicality of aid from 1993 to 2007 (Late period). Unfortunately, for the Cold-
war period, the first institutional quality observations with wide developing country
coverage is in 1985 so it is possible that the cyclicality of aid influenced institutional
quality measures, though given the arguments above I would expect this to be
unlikely.
A more subtle possibility is that the factors which influence assessments by ex-
ternal observers of institutional quality are the same as those which influence donor
behaviour. It is therefore possible that a third omitted variable is determining the
correlation between institutional quality and the cyclicality of aid flows. However,
the robustness of the results to both the pooled and within specifications require
that strict conditions to be imposed on any omitted variable. In particular, both
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the level of the variable would have to be correlated with institutional quality and
the change would also have to be correlated with the change in institutional quality
and is not one of the control variables used in the regressions.
Ideally one would use an instrument which is not subject to reverse causality
and can account for the level and change in institutional quality over the sample. La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) emphasize the importance
the legal origins of a country’s institutions. Unfortunately, the historical legal system
will not be a good instrument for institutions in this paper. Because the results hold
for both the pooled and within models but not the between model, any instrument
which is a static over time will not be a good instrument. This problem with static
instruments is most stark in the within regression specification where the change in
institutional quality is the source of the variation.14
Nonetheless, I report instrument variable regressions which use the settler
mortality estimates from Acemoglu, Johnonson and Robinson (2001, 2006) as an
instrument for institutional quality. These estimates have been used by a number
of papers to instrument institutions (e.g. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych,
2008). Table 2.24 reports the first-stage estimates from regressing institutional
quality on settler mortality. In my dataset settler mortality is a weak instrument for
institutional quality, where the first stage regression coefficient on settler mortality
is insignificant.1516 The sign on settler mortality is negative, but the first stage
14Typically papers which examine the impact of institutional quality only consider pooled re-
gressions and not the within specification, e.g. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008).
15P − value = 0.169
16Results reported here use the updated settler mortality estimates in Acemoglu, Johnson and
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coefficients are not significant at standard significance levels. In Table 2.25 I report
the instrument variable estimates, however, given the weak first stage results one
should interpret the results considering the problems with weak instruments. The
instrumental variable estimates find a negative correlation between institutional
quality and the correlation between aid and GDP but the estimated coefficient is
not significant.17
There are two reasons why settler mortality is a weak instrument for insti-
tutional quality in this paper, (a) settler mortality will not capture the change in
institutional quality overtime and hence fails to capture an important source of
variation for the results and (b) as Albouy (2008) notes, settler mortality is a weak
instrument for institutional quality once the neo-Europeans (USA, Canada, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand) are excluded.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper documents a new fact: the correlation between official development
assistance (ODA) and GDP is negatively related to the quality to institutions. As
the quality of institutions in a country deteriorate, they are more likely to receive
procyclical rather than countercyclical aid. In particular institutional measures
related to corruption, rule of law, property rights and public sector management
and structural policies display a robust negative correlated with aid procylicality.
Robinson (2006). Higher P − value results from the original Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001) estimates.
17P − value = 0.168.
93
This result is robust to numerous specifications and control variables.
The relationship between institutional quality and the cyclicality of aid also
reconciles conflicting empirical results about aid cyclicality in Pallage and Robe
(2001) and Rand and Tarp (2002).
There appear to be important differences between the aid cyclicality from
bilateral donors and multilateral donors. Bilateral donors give more procyclical aid
disbursements to countries with weak institutions, while multilateral donors give
more procyclical aid commitments for the following year. In Banerjee (2010) I show
that a dynamic moral hazard model can explain many of these empirical facts about
aid flows.
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Figure 2.1: Malawi: GDP and ODA series with HP trend
2.9 Figures
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Figure 2.2: The Democratic Republic of the Congo: GDP and ODA series with HP
trend
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Figure 2.3: Uganda: GDP and ODA series with HP trend














2 year ahead correlation of institutional quality: spliced
Figure 2.4: 2 year ahead correlation of institutions
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Mean Rule of law and property rights
Figure 2.5: 2 year ahead correlation of institutions
















Figure 2.6: Total aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
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Figure 2.7: Multilateral aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
















Figure 2.8: Bilateral aid: Institutions plot against ρ(aid,GDP )
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Commitments - Pooled data




Table 2.1: Aid Receiving Countries, Moments 1974-2007
Country corr(aidt, gdpt) Aid/GDP SD(GDP) SD(Aid) Government
Effectiveness in 2006
Algeria 0.388 0.004 0.058 0.188 -0.395
Argentina 0.322 0.001 0.188 0.307 0.423
Bangladesh 0.057 0.066 0.067 0.103 -0.643
Benin 0.504 0.087 0.057 0.150 0.008
Bolivia 0.103 0.052 0.030 0.202 0.073
Botswana 0.628 0.087 0.077 0.108 0.244
Botswana 0.628 0.087 0.077 0.108 0.244
Brazil 0.405 0.001 0.074 0.260 -0.299
Burkina Faso -0.004 0.111 0.041 0.086 -0.680
Burundi -0.008 0.141 0.044 0.070 -0.974
Cameroon 0.257 0.031 0.074 0.183 -1.166
Central African Republic -0.043 0.133 0.060 0.148 -0.907
Chad 0.703 0.119 0.084 0.263 -0.646
Chile 0.134 0.001 0.058 2.581 0.956
China -0.449 0.003 0.116 0.355 0.136
Colombia 0.668 0.002 0.019 0.160 0.253
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.743 0.044 0.101 0.287 -1.702
Congo, Rep. 0.360 0.057 0.135 0.208 -1.221
Costa Rica 0.327 0.030 0.041 0.235 -0.007
Cote d’Ivoire -0.217 0.024 0.034 0.133 0.080
Dominican Republic 0.270 0.017 0.063 0.288 -0.780
Ecuador -0.216 0.011 0.061 0.200 -0.896
El Salvador 0.235 0.061 0.095 0.139 -0.252
Ethiopia 0.127 0.058 0.076 0.165 -1.037
Ethiopia 0.127 0.058 0.076 0.165 -1.037
Gabon 0.078 0.019 0.094 0.163 -0.987
Gambia, The 0.042 0.040 0.084 0.672 -0.381
Ghana 0.835 0.052 0.278 0.515 -0.372
Guatemala 0.293 0.016 0.046 0.234 -0.485
Guinea -0.390 0.055 0.352 0.214 -1.073
Guinea-Bissau 0.851 0.448 0.183 0.229 -0.632
Guyana -0.160 0.090 0.048 0.413 -0.137
Haiti -0.083 0.078 0.041 0.123 -1.031
Honduras 0.408 0.063 0.068 0.318 -0.821
India -0.456 0.008 0.023 0.149 -0.205
Indonesia 0.283 0.012 0.047 0.182 0.142
Jamaica 0.091 0.050 0.031 0.331 -0.224
Jordan 0.107 0.180 0.041 0.319 0.228
Kenya 0.107 0.068 0.029 0.146 -0.257
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Country corr(aidt, gdpt) Aid/GDP SD(GDP) SD(Aid) Government
Effectiveness in 2006
Madagascar -0.230 0.070 0.046 0.170 -0.975
Malawi -0.443 0.153 0.041 0.119 -0.669
Malaysia 0.225 0.006 0.043 0.347 0.875
Mali 0.625 0.176 0.068 0.171 -0.686
Mauritania 0.200 0.269 0.048 0.165 0.204
Mexico -0.153 0.001 0.054 0.376 -0.038
Morocco 0.034 0.036 0.027 0.334 -0.050
Mozambique 0.508 0.170 0.070 0.485 -0.272
Nepal 0.001 0.086 0.034 0.102 -0.253
Nicaragua 0.512 0.080 0.406 0.420 -0.920
Niger -0.085 0.121 0.049 0.153 -1.075
Nigeria 0.641 0.003 0.187 1.487 -1.363
Pakistan 0.412 0.035 0.047 0.203 -0.517
Panama 0.206 0.011 0.054 0.292 -0.293
Papua New Guinea 0.006 0.125 0.041 0.078 -0.342
Paraguay 1.000 0.016 0.002 0.266 -0.766
Peru 0.481 0.013 0.146 0.217 -0.166
Philippines -0.130 0.015 0.039 0.162 -0.019
Rwanda 0.309 0.114 0.094 0.121 -1.235
Senegal 0.188 0.103 0.030 0.156 -0.158
Sierra Leone 0.041 0.073 0.061 0.279 -0.588
Sri Lanka 0.199 0.083 0.031 0.178 -0.443
Sudan 0.514 0.068 0.200 0.269 -1.491
Syrian Arab Republic -0.317 0.069 0.149 0.335 -0.153
Thailand 0.179 0.011 0.027 0.133 0.464
Togo 0.010 0.119 0.065 0.188 -0.680
Trinidad and Tobago -0.212 0.002 0.068 0.677 0.119
Tunisia -0.203 0.031 0.034 0.116 0.509
Uganda 0.561 0.068 0.236 0.296 -0.572
Uruguay 0.117 0.003 0.065 0.336 -0.079
Venezuela, RB 0.516 0.000 0.038 3.262 -0.931
Zambia 0.273 0.096 0.112 0.344 -0.589
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Table 2.2: Major OECD Bilateral Donors

















Table 2.3: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; all donors
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.107 *** -0.126 *** -0.096 **
(0.033) (0.046) (0.041)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.083 0.091 0.056
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.4: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality with control variables; all donors
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.077* -0.140* -0.069
(0.041) (0.072) (0.051)
Aid/GDP 0.386 -1.240 0.874*
(0.510) (1.502) (0.481)
Average(GDP) -0.036 -0.297 0.016
(0.062) (0.186) (0.058)
SD(Aid) 0.078 0.018 0.138
(0.098) (0.095) (0.141)
SD(GDP) 1.231 0.488 1.630 ***
(1.022) (0.817) (0.577)
Conflict dummy -0.090 -0.267* -0.052
(0.093) (0.137) (0.088)
Coup dummy -0.057 -0.044 -0.022
(0.072) (0.111) (0.084)
Polity IV -0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Civil war dummy -0.013 -0.007 -0.015
(0.025) (0.052) (0.030)
Inflation crisis 0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
SD(Terms of trade) 0.217 0.333 -0.013
(0.349) (0.634) (0.357)
Capital Flows/Aid 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.126 0.124 0.196
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.5: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; all donors, Band-pass Filter
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.117 *** -0.131 ** -0.108 **
(0.039) (0.053) (0.051)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.067 0.074 0.039
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.6: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality with control variables; all donors,
Band-pass filter
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.080† -0.143* -0.062
(0.048) (0.078) (0.064)
Aid/GDP 0.446 -1.427 0.965*
(0.578) (1.736) (0.570)
Average(GDP) -0.084 -0.425 ** -0.043
(0.073) (0.210) (0.072)
SD(Aid) 0.206 0.130 0.188
(0.176) (0.242) (0.235)
SD(GDP) 1.374 0.761 1.938 **
(1.268) (0.848) (0.933)
Conflict dummy -0.088 -0.198 -0.116
(0.110) (0.146) (0.109)
Coup dummy -0.066 -0.028 -0.019
(0.089) (0.138) (0.113)
Polity IV -0.001 0.002 -0.008 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Civil war dummy -0.046 -0.048 -0.069*
(0.033) (0.061) (0.039)
Inflation crisis -0.003 -0.014 -0.002
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
SD(Terms of trade) 0.400 0.911* -0.089
(0.378) (0.543) (0.486)
Capital Flows/Aid 0.001 -0.001 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.102 0.130 0.187
Note: †P-value=0.1017, Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.7: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; multilateral and bilateral aid
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Independent variable Pooled Within Between
Multilateral Aid
Institutions -0.080 ** -0.092* -0.074*
(0.031) (0.046) (0.041)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.046 0.049 0.019
Bilateral Aid
Institutions -0.103 *** -0.106 ** -0.101 **
(0.029) (0.045) (0.040)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.078 0.064 0.067
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.8: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; multilateral aid
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Independent variable Pooled Within Time Between
Multilateral Aid
Institutions -0.030 -0.077 -0.031
(0.038) (0.067) (0.052)
Aid/GDP 0.131 -2.300 0.814
(1.374) (3.664) (1.261)
Average(GDP) -0.029 -0.262* 0.019
(0.065) (0.137) (0.062)
SD(Aid) 0.028 0.008 0.082
(0.100) (0.088) (0.147)
SD(GDP) 1.191 0.286 1.806 ***
(1.075) (0.708) (0.625)
Conflict dummy -0.044 -0.271* 0.031
(0.091) (0.138) (0.090)
Coup dummy -0.036 0.070 -0.063
(0.066) (0.094) (0.086)
Polity IV -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Civil war dummy 0.004 -0.030 0.023
(0.020) (0.051) (0.033)
Inflation crisis -0.000 0.002 -0.003
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
SD(Terms of trade) 0.239 0.034 0.174
(0.383) (0.774) (0.368)
Capital Flows/Aid 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.093 0.109 0.134
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.9: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; bilateral aid
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Independent variable Pooled Within Time Between
Bilateral Aid
Institutions -0.103 *** -0.134 ** -0.103 **
(0.038) (0.063) (0.048)
Aid/GDP 0.721 -3.186 1.380*
(0.855) (2.824) (0.764)
Average(GDP) -0.036 -0.389 0.014
(0.067) (0.237) (0.055)
SD(Aid) 0.150 -0.005 0.233*
(0.096) (0.142) (0.117)
SD(GDP) 0.930 -0.113 1.402 **
(1.222) (1.001) (0.558)
Conflict dummy -0.154* -0.129 -0.178 **
(0.087) (0.135) (0.083)
Coup dummy -0.033 -0.011 -0.025
(0.073) (0.126) (0.082)
Polity IV 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Civil war dummy -0.011 -0.004 -0.016
(0.025) (0.047) (0.029)
Inflation crisis -0.001 0.003 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
SD(Terms of trade) 0.068 -0.457 0.040
(0.381) (0.484) (0.348)
Capital Flows/Aid -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs 122 122 61
Adj. R2 0.119 0.084 0.233
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.10: Aid cyclicality and individual institutional quality measures; all donors
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Institutional measure Simple With Controls Obs
Corruption -0.065 ** -0.056* 122
(0.031) (0.029)
Rule of Law -0.080 *** -0.046 122
(0.027) (0.033)
Quality of Bureaucracy -0.063 ** -0.020 122
(0.028) (0.032)
Ethnic Tension -0.027 -0.010 122
(0.021) (0.031)
Repudiation of Government Contracts -0.067 *** -0.005 122
(0.024) (0.037)
Expropriation of Private Investment -0.096 *** -0.058* 122
(0.023) (0.030)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.11: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality individual measures with con-
trols; multilateral and bilateral aid
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Institutional measure Simple With Controls Obs
Multilateral Aid
Corruption -0.046 -0.032 122
(0.028) (0.030)
Rule of Law -0.056 ** -0.024 122
(0.026) (0.032)
Quality of Bureaucracy -0.039 -0.003 122
(0.026) (0.030)
Ethnic Tension -0.033* -0.018 122
(0.017) (0.026)
Repudiation of Government Contracts -0.036* 0.032 122
(0.020) (0.030)
Expropriation of Private Investment -0.060 ** -0.012 122
(0.024) (0.031)
Bilateral Aid
Corruption -0.092 *** -0.089 *** 122
(0.027) (0.031)
Rule of Law -0.072 *** -0.064 ** 122
(0.025) (0.030)
Quality of Bureaucracy -0.061 ** -0.034 122
(0.031) (0.036)
Ethnic Tension -0.027 -0.023 122
(0.021) (0.030)
Repudiation of Government Contracts -0.061 ** -0.016 122
(0.024) (0.039)
Expropriation of Private Investment -0.090 *** -0.072 ** 122
(0.023) (0.031)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.12: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; all donors, alternative measures
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Kaufmann and Kraay Measures
Institutional measure Simple With Controls Obs
Voice and Accountability -0.120 ** -0.092 71
(0.053) (0.130)
Political Stability -0.101* -0.166* 71
(0.053) (0.085)
Government Effectiveness -0.146 ** -0.110 71
(0.069) (0.107)
Regulatory Quality -0.145 ** -0.123 71
(0.064) (0.137)
Rule of Law -0.171 ** -0.151 71
(0.066) (0.106)
Control of Corruption -0.101* -0.166* 71
(0.053) (0.085)
CPIA measures
Debt Policy -0.132* -0.164* 37
(0.072) (0.094)
Economic Management Cluster -0.155 -0.239* 37
(0.110) (0.131)
Revenue Mobilisation -0.358 *** -0.309 ** 37
(0.093) (0.134)
Equity of Resources -0.213 -0.221 37
(0.140) (0.151)
Financial Sector -0.361 *** -0.265 37
(0.102) (0.207)
Fiscal Policy -0.082 -0.141 37
(0.119) (0.127)
Macroeconomic Management -0.138 -0.259* 37
(0.104) (0.148)
Property Rights -0.255 ** -0.315* 37
(0.102) (0.153)
Public Sector Management Cluster -0.383 *** -0.414 ** 37
(0.108) (0.186)
Budgetary Management -0.223 ** -0.242 37
(0.085) (0.152)
Public Administration -0.332 ** -0.271 37
(0.156) (0.185)
Structural Policies Cluster -0.523 *** -0.553 *** 37
(0.122) (0.178)
Trade Rating -0.192 -0.168 37
(0.122) (0.166)
Corruption -0.240 ** -0.309 37
(0.110) (0.186)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.13: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; multilateral donors, alternative
measures
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Kaufmann and Kraay Measures
Institutional measure Simple With Controls Obs
Voice and Accountability -0.064 ** -0.050 71
(0.029) (0.059)
Political Stability -0.017 -0.003 71
(0.030) (0.041)
Government Effectiveness -0.086 ** -0.116 ** 71
(0.037) (0.053)
Regulatory Quality -0.075 ** -0.109 71
(0.033) (0.069)
Rule of Law -0.095 ** -0.125 ** 71
(0.037) (0.051)
Control of Corruption -0.017 -0.003 71
(0.030) (0.041)
CPIA measures
Debt Policy -0.099* -0.079 37
(0.053) (0.073)
Economic Management Cluster -0.125 -0.098 37
(0.077) (0.110)
Revenue Mobilisation -0.205 ** -0.171 37
(0.082) (0.117)
Equity of Resources -0.126 -0.130 37
(0.078) (0.104)
Financial Sector -0.373 *** -0.433 ** 37
(0.087) (0.193)
Fiscal Policy -0.059 -0.007 37
(0.078) (0.146)
Macroeconomic Management -0.136* -0.125 37
(0.074) (0.107)
Property Rights -0.295 *** -0.331 *** 37
(0.075) (0.112)
Public Sector Management Cluster -0.292 *** -0.296* 37
(0.099) (0.147)
Budgetary Management -0.199 *** -0.144 37
(0.063) (0.107)
Public Administration -0.239 ** -0.267* 37
(0.115) (0.149)
Structural Policies Cluster -0.471 *** -0.536 *** 37
(0.129) (0.179)
Trade Rating -0.108 -0.064 37
(0.092) (0.166)
Corruption -0.127 -0.110 37
(0.094) (0.173)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.14: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality; total bilateral donors, alterna-
tive measures
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Kaufmann and Kraay Measures
Institutional measure simple with controls Obs
Voice and Accountability -0.091 ** -0.116*
(0.045) (0.069)
Political Stability -0.053 -0.150 ***
(0.039) (0.044)
Government Effectiveness -0.206 *** -0.156 **
(0.058) (0.076)
Regulatory Quality -0.087* -0.057
(0.049) (0.068)
Rule of Law -0.142 *** -0.084
(0.049) (0.053)
Control of Corruption -0.160 *** -0.031
(0.051) (0.063)
CPIA measures
Debt Policy -0.091 -0.080 37
(0.072) (0.110)
Economic Management Cluster -0.128 -0.113 37
(0.113) (0.159)
Revenue Mobilisation -0.354 *** -0.341* 37
(0.088) (0.179)
Equity of Resources -0.178 -0.117 37
(0.158) (0.192)
Financial Sector -0.297 *** -0.126 37
(0.093) (0.229)
Fiscal Policy -0.125 -0.092 37
(0.130) (0.181)
Macroeconomic Management -0.108 -0.104 37
(0.101) (0.153)
Property Rights -0.208* -0.138 37
(0.107) (0.175)
Public Sector Management Cluster -0.351 *** -0.321 37
(0.121) (0.237)
Budgetary Management -0.226 ** -0.196 37
(0.100) (0.183)
Public Administration -0.288 -0.173 37
(0.174) (0.253)
Structural Policies Cluster -0.368 ** -0.327 37
(0.146) (0.245)
Trade Rating -0.015 0.051 37
(0.145) (0.253)
Corruption -0.194* -0.196 37
(0.112) (0.195)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.15: Determinants of the level of aid, dependent variable aid to GDP ratio
Aid per capita (1) (2)
Institutions -0.0254*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.007)
GDP per capita -0.048***
(0.009)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.16: Average institutional quality
sample A verage institutional quality
Mean Median
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.032 3.185
Non sub-Saharan Africa 3.364 3.558
Rand-Tarp sample 3.460 3.579
Not Rand-Tarp sample 3.185 3.319
Note that institutional quality is measured on a 0-6 scale.
Table 2.17: Is Africa treated differently?
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Regression (2.4) Regression(2.5)




Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.18: Reconciling Rand and Tarp (2002) with Pallage and Robe (2001)
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Regression (2.6) Regression(2.7)




Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.19: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst−1, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.061 ** -0.074 *** -0.045
(0.026) (0.027) (0.043)
Obs 120 120 60
Adj. R2 0.035 0.077 -0.016
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.20: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality with control variables; all donors
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst−1, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.099 ** -0.106* -0.122*
(0.040) (0.056) (0.067)
Aid/GDP 0.173 1.030 -0.346
(1.086) (1.816) (1.675)
Average(GDP) 0.005 -0.234* -0.005
(0.060) (0.129) (0.069)
SD(Aid) -0.000 ** -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SD(GDP) -0.096 -0.368 0.314
(0.581) (0.492) (0.647)
SD(Conflict) -0.017 0.019 -0.067
(0.073) (0.080) (0.095)
Coup dummy -0.084 -0.086 -0.105
(0.061) (0.076) (0.094)
Conflict dummy 0.005 -0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Civil war dummy 0.018 0.014 0.022
(0.036) (0.042) (0.059)
Inflation crisis -0.012 -0.013 -0.020
(0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
SD(Terms of trade) 0.184 0.500 0.003
(0.358) (0.530) (0.393)
Capital Flows/Aid 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs 120 120 60
Adj. R2 0.014 0.122 -0.092
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.21: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality with control variables; bilateral
donors
Dependent variable corr(aid disbursementst, gdpt)
Country Institutions Institutions (with Controls) Obs
United States -0.068* -0.048 120
(0.036) (0.050)
United Kingdom -0.077 ** -0.084* 120
(0.034) (0.046)
Germany -0.066 ** -0.079 ** 120
(0.027) (0.038)
France -0.081 ** -0.030 120
(0.036) (0.047)
Canada -0.082 ** -0.012 120
(0.033) (0.039)
Japan -0.075 *** -0.106 *** 120
(0.028) (0.038)
Netherlands -0.114 *** -0.088 ** 120
(0.029) (0.039)
Italy 0.053* 0.108 *** 118
(0.029) (0.039)
Switzerland -0.052* -0.047 116
(0.028) (0.038)
Belgium -0.126 *** -0.117 *** 116
(0.025) (0.035)
Scandinavia -0.021 0.030 116
(0.032) (0.046)
Australia -0.082 *** -0.107 ** 106
(0.031) (0.049)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Results from Pooled Regression. Simple regression run with intercept and constant only
Controls: Aid/GDP, Average(GDP), SD(Aid), SD(GDP), Conflict Dummy, Coup Dummy, Polity IV,
Civil War Dummy, Inflation Crisis, SD(Terms of Trade), Capital Flows/Aid
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Table 2.22: Cylicality of aid commitments and institutional quality
Dependent variable corr(aid commitmentst+1, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Total aid commitments
Institutions -0.012 -0.001 -0.024
(0.023) (0.034) (0.036)
Multilateral aid commitments
Institutions -0.061 ** -0.074 *** -0.045
(0.026) (0.027) (0.043)
Bilateral aid commitments
Institutions 0.027 0.045 0.008
(0.027) (0.036) (0.039)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
121
Table 2.23: Aid cyclicality and institutional quality with control variables; Multi-
lateral aid
Dependent variable corr(aid commitmentst+1, gdpt)
Pooled Within Between
Institutions -0.088 ** -0.097 ** -0.107
(0.036) (0.047) (0.070)
Aid/GDP -0.929 0.012 -1.408
(0.791) (1.437) (1.132)
Average(GDP) -0.020 -0.255 ** -0.019
(0.057) (0.125) (0.067)
SD(Aid) -0.031 -0.160 -0.069
(0.135) (0.172) (0.217)
SD(GDP) -0.005 -0.045 0.334
(0.589) (0.437) (0.648)
Conflict dummy 0.025 0.052 -0.013
(0.070) (0.071) (0.099)
Coup dummy -0.086 -0.079 -0.103
(0.063) (0.074) (0.095)
Polity IV 0.003 0.003 ** 0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Civil War dummy 0.006 0.009 0.006
(0.028) (0.037) (0.035)
Inflation Crisis -0.008 -0.006 -0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
SD(Terms of Trade) 0.258 0.332 0.150
(0.348) (0.542) (0.400)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2.24: Settler mortality as an instrumental variable, first stage estimates







Note: P − values in parentheses.
Settler mortality data from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)
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Table 2.25: Instrumental variable estimates
First Stage Dependent variable: mean of ICRG corruption,
Rule of Law and Expropriation risk.






Note: P − values in parentheses.
Settler mortality data from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)
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Chapter 3
Optimal Procyclical Fiscal Policy Without Procyclical Government
Spending
3.1 Introduction
Procyclical fiscal policy,1 can be caused by either procyclical government ex-
penditure, countercyclical taxes of both. Within the class of models where procycli-
cal fiscal policy is the outcome of optimal policy, the majority of models explain
procyclical fiscal policy as the result of procyclical government expenditures. For ex-
ample, Riascos and Vegh (2003), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) and Cuadra, Sanchez
and Sapriza (2009) consider imperfections in either international credit markets
while Tornell and Lane, (1998), Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Ilzetzki (2007) consider
from political economy distortions. Indeed as Ilzetzki and Vegh (2009) show pro-
cyclical government expenditure is an important explanation for procyclical fiscal
policy. However, the purpose of this paper is to highlight the mechanism through
which sovereign default affects optimal tax policy.
Gavin and Perotti (1997) made the influential insight that imperfections in
international credit markets might cause procyclical fiscal policy,
“Our view is that fiscal policymakers in Latin America have typically faced a
1Procyclical fiscal policy is defined as fiscal policy which is expansionary during booms and
contractionary during recessions.
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loss of confidence and thus intensified borrowing constraints during bad macroeco-
nomic times. The loss of market access makes it impossible to run countercyclical
fiscal policy, at least in bad times. A full description of Latin American fiscal out-
comes needs to account for this precarious creditworthiness”. Gavin and Perotti
(1997) p.39 (emphasis in original text).
This paper uses an endogenous sovereign default framework to endogenously
generate precarious creditworthiness as the outcome of the government’s incen-
tives to default. It then combines the endogenous sovereign default literature (e.g
Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, Arellano, 2008) with the Ramsey taxation literature
(e.g. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996) to analyse the impact of the option of
government default on optimal taxation. Following the Ramsey taxation literature,
I assume that government expenditure is exogenous and the government’s problem is
to determine the tax policy which maximises household welfare subject to financing
exogenous government expenditures. In the model even though government expen-
ditures are acyclical, fiscal policy is procyclical when the government has the option
to default.
Direct information about the cyclicality of actual government tax rates are
not readily available for a comprehensive study, therefore, most empirical studies
focus on tax revenues. However, as Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) argue it
only makes sense to measure fiscal policy with instruments rather than outcomes.
There are a number of papers which provide historical examples of countercyclical
tax rates. Talvi and Vegh (2005), provide evidence that during the economic boom
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in 1991 to 1994 in Argentina, tax rates were reduced and that when the economy
went into recession in 1995, tax rates were increased. Also, Vincente and Rial (2007)
provide evidence that in the middle of the recession during the Uruguayan debt crisis
of 2002-2003 the government dramatically increased taxes, which were later reduced
during the expansionary period. Futhermore, Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009)
provide similar evidence of procyclical value added tax rates for Mexico during the
1990s.
In the model there are domestic households, a domestic government and for-
eign lenders. Households value consumption and leisure and do not have access to
storage assets. To finance the fixed stream of government expenditures, the gov-
ernment can levy consumption taxes on households or borrow from international
capital markets. The government can only borrow by issuing a one period non-state
contingent bond. When the government has access to international capital markets,
it has the option to default on existing debt. Default enables the government to
lower taxation because it no-longer has to repay existing debts. However, if the
government defaults it then unable to access capital markets for a stochastic period
of time.
The key assumption of the model is that if the government defaults there
is an exogenous loss in productivity which is higher in booms than in recessions.
Arrellano (2008) showed that this structure of procyclical default costs combined
with persistent shocks enable models of sovereign default to fit many of the empirical
regularities about sovereign default episodes. Arteta and Hale (2006), Rose (2005)
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and Dooley (2000) provide empirical evidence that output losses from default are
higher in booms than recessions. Mendoza and Yue (2008) provide a mechanism
which endogenously generates default costs which are higher in recessions than in
booms by add working capital to an endogenous sovereign default model.
There is perfect competition in International capital markets which are popu-
lated by risk neutral foreign lenders. The foreign lenders are willing to lend to the
government until borrowing reaches levels at which the government will default with
certainty. When the probability of default is less than 100% foreign lenders charge
a risk premium to compensate for the risk of government default. In the model
because the exogenous loss of productivity from default are lower in recessions than
booms, the government is more likely to default in recessions for a given level of
debt because it is less costly. To compensate financial markets for the higher prob-
ability of default in recessions, financial markets charge higher interest rate spreads
for borrowing during recessions. It is therefore, costly for the government to use
borrowing during recessions to smooth tax rates. Instead the government optimally
increases tax rates in recessions to finance government expenditures while during
booms, the government decreases taxes and increases borrowing. Thus the optimal
tax policy is countercyclical.
If the option to default is excluded in the model, and government must repay
past borrowing in all states, the optimal taxation policy is acyclical. The result
without default is consistent with Ramsey tax models with state contingent debt
(Lucas and Stokey, 1984 and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996). In those models,
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the optimal tax policy is to smooth the tax distortion over states. Aiyagari, Marcet,
Sargent and Seppala (2002) show that similar results hold for a Ramsey model with
only risk-free debt. Therefore, the default friction significantly changes the optimal
Ramsey tax policy.
A crucial assumption in the model is that households are credit constrained.
If households are able to borrow without increasing cost (or at a lower cost than
the government) then households can use their own borrowing in recessions to pay
higher taxes, while also smoothing consumption.
Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) follow a similar approach where they anal-
yse the impact of sovereign default on optimal fiscal policy, however, in their model
government expenditures are also endogenous. The contribution of this paper is to
show that endogenous default causes optimal fiscal policy to be procyclical with-
out procyclical government expenditures. Also confining the analysis to exogenous
government expenditures enables comparisons between this paper and the existing
literature on Ramsey taxation. Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (2000) consider a
similar two period model, however, default in their model occurs when the economy
hits an exogenous credit ceiling rather than the credit ceiling being endogenously
determined. Instead this paper utilises the endogenous sovereign default framework
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and in particular the insights from Arellano (2008)
that the cost of default must be higher in booms than recessions and that output




The model consists of a small open economy with households, a government
and foreign lenders. Household’s have preferences over the present discount stream
of consumption and do not have access to a storage asset. The government must
finance a constant stream of wasteful expenditures in each period. The government
can finance these expenditures through either a consumption tax or by borrowing
from abroad. Subject to financing this exogenous stream of government expendi-
tures, the government cares about households and seeks to maximise their utility.
The only asset traded by the government is a one period non-contingent bond. The
government can hold both negative and positive amounts of this asset. Debt con-
tracts are not enforceable since the government has the option to default on existing
debts. There is a productivity cost to the economy if the government defaults on
its debt, which is higher in booms than in recessions.
3.2.1 Households/Firms
There is an infinitely lived representative household with preferences over the
stream of consumption and leisure. Households own the firms. They also receive a






βtu(ct, 1− ht) (3.1)
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s.t.
eztf(ht) + γGt ≥ (1 + τt) ct (3.2)
Where, 0 < β < 1 is the household discount factor, c is consumption and h is
labour input, the production function has non-increasing returns to scale, f ′(.) > 0
and f ′′(.) ≤ 0 and τ is the consumption tax2. Note that households are unable
to access international capital markets. The log productivity shock, zt follows an
AR(1) process,
zt = ρzt−1 + εt (3.3)
Where εt is an i.i.d. N(0, σ
2) process.
Since the household does not have access to intertemporal assets, the house-
hold’s optimisation problem is equivalent to solving a sequence of static problems
from t = 0, ...∞,
max
(ct,1−ht)
Etu(ct, 1− ht) (3.4)
s.t.
eztf(ht) + γGt ≥ (1 + τt) ct (3.5)
2Using either consumption or labour taxes do not affect my results, because households do not
have access to intertemporal assets.
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The first order conditions from the households optimisation are,
uc(ct, 1− ht)





eztf(ht) + γGt = (1 + τt) ct (3.7)
The FOCs yield consumption and labour demand functions which are functions
of the tax rate, τ and the productivity shock z,
c(τt, zt)
h(τt, zt)
3.2.2 International Capital Markets
Foreign creditors are risk-neutral and face a constant opportunity cost of funds,
R, which is the gross risk-free interest rate. There is no information asymmetry.
Foreign creditors choose the amount of one-period bonds to sell to the government
Bt+1 in order to maximise expected profits π taking the discount price of the bonds,
q as given,
πt = qtBt+1 − (1− δt)
(R)
Bt+1 (3.8)
Where δ is the probability of default by the government. If the government is
a net creditor, the probability of default is zero. If the government is a net debtor,
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the price is adjusted for the default risk, q = (1−δ)
(R)
. Since 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 the price is
bounded [0 < q < 1/(R)]. The gross interest rate for the debtor government is,
1 + rc = 1/q.
3.2.3 Government
3.2.3.1 The Government’s Optimisation Problem
The government has pledged to make an exogenous stream of expenditures, Gt,
(t = 0, 1, 2, ...). Assuming the country has access to international capital markets,
the government comes into the period with Bt assets, it observes, zt and chooses
whether to repay (r) or default (d) and and chooses the tax rate in each state, τ r or
τ d in order to maximise the household’s indirect utility function, subject to financ-
ing government expenditure, G. When the government has access to international
capital markets, the government also chooses the asset holdings in the next period,
Bt+1, and faces the following optimisation problem,
V (zt, Bt) = max
r,Bt+1,τr,d,τd
{V r(zt, Bt), V d(zt)} (3.9)
Where, V (.) is the household’s value function when the government has access
to international capital markets, V r(.) is the household’s value function if it decides
to repay the existing debt −Bt, and V d is the household’s value function if it decides
to default on the debt.
If the government decides to repay the debt, it can choose to borrow from
international capital markets to pay for any temporary shortfalls in tax receipts. Of
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course, these borrowings must be paid back in the future. The government chooses
Bt+1 and τ
r to maximise the household’s indirect utility,
V r(zt, Bt) = max
Bt+1,τr
u(c(τ rt , zt), 1− h(τ rt , zt)) + βEtV (zt+1, Bt+1) (3.10)
s.t.
τ rc(τ rt , zt) +Bt − q(ztBt+1)Bt+1 ≥ Gt (3.11)
The government collects τtct in tax revenue and chooses Bt+1 taking the bond
discount price schedule, q(zt, Bt+1), as given in order to finance government spending
and maximise household utility.
If the government defaults, the government can no-longer borrow from interna-
tional capital markets. The country enters a period of autarky and must finance all
government spending with contemporaneous taxation. Once in autarky, the coun-
try can re-enter capital markets with probability θ in each period. During default,
there is a loss in productivity in autarky which is greater in booms than recessions.
Arellano (2008) shows that a specification of the productivity cost from default of




φE(z) if z > φE(z)
z if z ≤ φE(z)
(3.12)
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The government’s problem in default takes the following form,
V d(k(zt)) = max
τd





t , k(zt)) ≥ Gt (3.14)
Thus in autarky, the government’s problem is to choose the tax rate such that
(3.14) holds with equality. In autarky the tax wedge changes mechanically with
the shocks (zt). This hinders the household’s ability to smooth labour supply and
consumption, hence potentially reducing expected utility relative to the case there
the government has access to international capital markets.
The trade balance (TB) in this model is given by government saving; the
difference between government revenues minus expenditures,
TB(t) = τ dt c(zt, τ
d
t )−G(t) (3.15)
3.2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The definition of a recursive competitive equilibrium is a Ramsey equilibrium.
The government optimally chooses tax rates in both repayment and default states
and then decides whether it is optimal to default or not.
Definition 3.2.1 Ramsey Equilibrium
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Table 3.1: Business cycle statistics
Mexican data (1980-2007) Benchmark model
σ(y) 2.37 2.52
σ(c) 2.90 2.61
σ(tax rate) 0.57 0.71
σ(tb) 2.04 2.72
ρ(y, c) 0.92 0.89
ρ(y, tax rate) -0.33 -0.34
ρ(y, r) -0.63 -0.17
ρ(y, tb) -0.72 -0.21
Note: Statistics for the interest rate are reported as percentage points. Trade balance as a percentage of GDP
The Ramsey equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy functions
for (i) households c, h (ii) government Bt+1, r, τ
r, d, τ d and (iii) the price functions
for bonds q such that:
1. Taking as given government policies, the household’s consumption c and labour
supply h policy functions satisfies the household optimisation problem.
2. Taking as given the bond price function q(zt, Bt+1), the government’s policy
functions for Bt+1, r, τ
r d, τ d satisfy the government’s optimisation problem.
3. Bond prices q reflect the government’s default probabilities and are consistent
with creditor’s expected zero profits.
3.3 Data
The data in Table 3.1 is taken from Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) for
Mexico between 1980 and 2007. They compute an effictive consumption tax rate
using the methodology in Mendoza et. al (1994). The key moment for this paper is
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the estimated effective tax rate which is countercyclical, ρ(y, tax rate) = -0.33.
3.4 Solution Method and Calibration
3.4.1 Solution Method
1. I use the first order condition (3.6) and the budget constraint (3.7) to solve for
the optimal consumption and labour supply conditions over a grid of taxes, τ
and productivity states p to give the policy functions,
c(τt, zt), h(τt, zt) (3.16)
2. For default states, calculate the minimum tax rate required to fund G over
the grid of z. These are the optimal tax rates whilst in default.
3. For repayment states, calculate the minimum tax rate required to fund G
over the grid of zt, Bt, Bt+1 triplets. These are the optimal tax rates for each
zt, Bt, Bt+1 triplet, (we still need to choose optimal asset position Bt+1 for each
zt, Bt pair).
4. Assume an initial price function q0(z, B)
5. Use the initial guesses for q0(z, B), V 0,d(p) and V 0,r(z,B) to iterate and find
the optimal V 1,r(z, B), choosing the Bt+1, τ
r pair and V 1,d(z) given q0(z,B).
6. Set V 1(z, B) = max r,d {V 1,r(zt, Bt), V 1,d(p)}
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7. Estimate the expected probability of default δ in each state and use a Gauss-
Jacobi updating scheme to find q1(p,B),
8. Check if qi+1(z, B) is sufficiently close to qi(z,B), if yes, STOP, if not return
to step 5 using qi+1(z,B) and V 1+1(z,B) as the new guesses.
3.4.2 Functional Forms
In order to show that endogenous sovereign default can cause procyclical fiscal
policy through procyclical tax policy alone, I use a similar calibration as Cuadra,
Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) with the only modification that government expendi-
tures are exogenous. This helps to highlights the marginal contribution of this paper
relative to the literature.






The linear production where labour is the only input,
f(h) = h (3.18)
3.4.3 Parameters
Table 3.2 shows the baseline calibration for the model. The risk aversion
parameter, is set equal to 2 as in Arellano (2008). The Frisch elasticity of labour
supply is set to 0.455 following Mendoza (1991). The risk-free rate r is sent to 1%
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Table 3.2: Parameter Values
Risk aversion σ 2
Labour elasticity 1/γ 2.2
Discount factor β 0.9
Risk free interest rate r 1%
Probability of redemption λ 10%
SD of productivity shocks σε 0.008
Persistence of productivity shocks ρ 0.86
Government expenditure/GDP G 16%
Default penalty threshold φ 95% of mean productivity
which corresponds to the US annual interest rate. To ensure the model has a finite
level of wealth in the steady-state β(1 + r) < 1. The probability of redemption
(probability of re-entering capital markets after default) is calibrated for a mean
duration of autarky of around 3.5 years. Government expenditures are calibrated
to match the mean level of government expenditures as a fraction of consumption
in Mexico between 1980 to 2005. The default penalty threshold, φ calibrates the
level of GDP above which the country pays a productivity cost upon default. The
parameter φ is calibrated to match the external debt service to GDP ratio of 4.5%.
3.5 Results
Figure 3.1 plots the bond price function q(zt, Bt+1) for low and high produc-
tivity shock states. For low levels of debt less than 2% of GDP, there is no default
risk. For levels of debt greater than 2% the discount rate on bonds in low produc-
tivity states increases at a faster rate than for high productivity states. This makes
borrowing more expensive in low productivity states than high productivity states.
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In Figure 3.2 the optimal tax function is plotted as a function of the level
of borrowing for a high and low productivity states. For debt levels of less than
2% of GDP, where the interest rates are the risk-free rate (Figure 3.1) the optimal
tax rate decreases as the debt increases. This shows that both debt and or taxes
can be used to finance the fixed stream of government expenditures. However,
in low productivity states for debt levels greater than 2% of GDP the optimal
tax rate increases for higher levels of government debt. From the government’s
budget constraint (3.11) the government receives qB funds from international capital
markets in the current period. As q decreases, for every dollar that the government
should repay in the next period, the government receives less from international
capital markets in the current period. Therefore, the government must tax at a
higher rate to finance exogenous government expenditures. This explains the upward
sloping part of the tax functions. For levels of debt greater than 6% of GDP in low
productivity states, it is optimal to default. For high productivity states the optimal
tax function only becomes upward sloping at higher debt levels (around 6% of GDP).
In stark contrast, Figure 3.3 plots the bond price function in the model without
an option to default. The q functions are effectively on top of each other with (note
the y axis scale). Thus without a default option for the government, for a given level
of debt there is no difference in the cost of borrowing across productivity states. The
effect of this on the optimal tax rate is shown in Figure 3.4. For both high and low
productivity states the tax function is decreasing as debt increases. Also unlike the
optimal tax function with default, there is no upward sloping portion. The absence
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Table 3.3: Model moments with and without default
With default Without default
σ(y) 2.37 1.52
σ(c) 2.60 1.34
σ(tax rate) 0.57 0.58
σ(tb) 2.04 2.72
ρ(y, c) 0.92 0.98
ρ(y, tax rate) -0.33 0.05
ρ(y, r) -0.63 -0.14
ρ(y, tb) -0.72 0.38
Note: Statistics for the interest rate are reported as percentage points. Trade balance as a percentage of GDP
of an upward sloping tax function will explain why the tax rate dynamics are so
different in the two models.
If the government can default on its debt, Table 3.1 shows thhat the tax
rate is countercyclical without procyclical government expenditures. This shows
that without procyclical government expenditures, the reason why tax policy is
countercyclical can be completely attributed to the countercyclical cost of borrowing
(i.e. credit precariousness in recessions). Because the interest rate is higher in
recessions, the government chooses to finance g using tax revenue, while in booms
because borrowing is cheaper the government borrows to finance g. Also note that
consumption is more volatile than output. With acyclical government expenditures,
the tax rate is more volatile than that in Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza where they
find σ(tax rate) = 0.22.
Table 3.3 compares the momemts from the model with default to the same
model without default risk. The model without default risk is closed assuming an
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ad-hoc upward sloping interest rate function is debt, 1/q = 1/β + ϕ(e(Bt+1−B̄) − 1)
(Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003). Table 3.3 shows that in the model without default
risk taxes are acyclical. This corresponds to the results from Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1996) and Aiygari et. al. (2002) who find that in a Ramsey model with
exogenous government spending (and no default), the optimal tax policy is acyclical
because it is optimal to smooth the tax distortion over states. Without default, the
trade balance is procyclical because with an acyclical tax policy, the government
repays debt during booms and accumulates deficits during recessions also generates
interest rates to be countercyclical. This also explains why output and consumption
are less volatile in the the model without default risk.3
The comparison of the models with and without default clearly shows the link
between the cyclicality of the interest rate spreads and the tax rate. Without de-
fault, the bond price function depends on only the level of debt in the next period
q(Bt+1). However, if governments have the option to default, the bond price func-
tion, q(zt, Bt+1) depends on both future borrowing Bt+1 and also on the productivity
state zt. Figures 3.1 and 3.3 show this graphically. If the possibility of default is
precluded, borrowing in low productivity states is not more costly than during high
output states. Therefore it is optimal to borrow more in recessions to smooth out the
tax distortion and hence consumption. However, if the government has the option
to default, then this increases the cost of borrowing during recessions for sufficiently
high levels of debt relative to booms to make tax policy countercyclical.








This paper develops a model where the option for a government to default
on its debt produces procyclical fiscal policy even though government expenditures
are acyclical. Instead fiscal policy is procyclical because the optimal tax policy
is countercyclical. The optimal tax policy is contrasted with an identical model
without a default option. Without a default option the optimal tax policy is acyclical
as found in the Ramsey taxation literature (Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996 and
Aiyagari et. al. 2002).
The model however, has a number of shortcomings. In particular the tractibil-
ity assumption that households do not have access to a storage asset unlike the
government. Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2009) present a two-period model with
household savings and household default and show that their results go through.
The critical assumption is that households’ are credit constrained in their borrow-
ing.
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Figure 3.2: Optimal tax functions
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Figure 3.3: Bond price functions: Without default option
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Figure 3.4: Optimal tax functions: Without default option
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